Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal by Tehranian, John
BYU Law Review
Volume 2005 | Issue 5 Article 2
12-1-2005
Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free
Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal
John Tehranian
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1201
(2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2005/iss5/2




Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate 
Liability Proposal 
John Tehranian∗ 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1202 
II. Copyright and the First Amendment .............................................. 1208 
 A. The Growing Clash ............................................................. 1208 
 B. The Inadequacy of Fair Use in Protecting Free Expression 1212 
III. Judicial Responses to the Clash .................................................... 1217 
 A. The Clash Denied: Free Expression and the Hegemony of 
the Property Rights Discourse .......................................... 1217 
 1. Judicial Denial?............................................................. 1218 
 2. The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright....................... 1221 
 B. The Clash Acknowledged: The Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy, Misappropriation, Injunctive Relief,  
and the Right of Publicity ................................................. 1222 
 1. Protecting the Right To Use Factual Information in 
Speech......................................................................... 1223 
 2. Protecting the Dissemination of Infringing Creative 
Speech......................................................................... 1224 
 3. Limiting the Right of Publicity on First Amendment 
Grounds: Comedy III’s Transformative-Use 
Approach..................................................................... 1226 
IV. An Intermediate Alternative to the Infringement/Fair-Use 
Dichotomy ........................................................................ 1230 
 A. Reconciling Copyright and Expressive Rights: Assessing 
the Extant Proposals ......................................................... 1231 
 1. Refining the Fair-Use Test............................................ 1232 
 a. Focusing on Market Failure .................................... 1232 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. A.B., Harvard 
University; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank the participants in the UC-Berkeley Center 
for Law & Technology and University of Wisconsin Institute for Legal Studies History of Copyright 
Workshop and particularly Oren Bracha, Mike Carroll, Anuj Desai, Mark Lemley, Robert Merges, 
Tom Nachbar, Tyler Ochoa, Tony Reese, Pamela Samuelson, and Siva Vaidhyanathan for their 
helpful comments and insights. 
2TEHRANIAN.FIN.DOC 2/21/2006 4:54:01 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1202 
 b. A Presumption in Favor of Transformative  
Use ........................................................................ 1233 
 2. Damages, Not Injunctions: Moving Copyright  
to a Liability, Rather Than Property, Regime............. 1234 
 a. The Judicial Option: Strict Scrutiny of Injunctive 
Relief ..................................................................... 1234 
 b. The Legislative Option: Expanding the Scope of 
Compulsory Licenses by Statute ........................... 1235 
 3. Judicial Creation of Joint Authorship ........................... 1237 
 B. The Proposal........................................................................ 1239 
 1. The Basics..................................................................... 1239 
 2. Clarifications and Limitations ...................................... 1242 
 C. Concerns.............................................................................. 1244 
 1. Implementation ............................................................. 1244 
 a. Enactment of the Intermediate Liability Scheme .... 1244 
 b. Rethinking the Derivative Rights Doctrine............. 1245 
 2. Workability ................................................................... 1247 
 a. Defining Transformative Use.................................. 1247 
 b. Moral Rights and the Potential for Market  
Glut........................................................................ 1250 
 c. Audience Interests in Semiotic Stability ................. 1253 
 3. Preserving Economic Incentives for Artistic Creation 
and Dissemination....................................................... 1255 
V. Conclusion ............................................................................... 1256 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God.”1 We have come a long way from this opening line 
to the Gospel according to John, as deification has morphed into 
reification. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court prohibited a 
nonprofit organization’s use of the term “Gay Olympic Games” because 
of a federal statute which granted an exclusive property right over the 
word “Olympic” to the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”).2 
 
 1. John 1:1. 
 2. Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, originally enacted as 36 U.S.C. § 380, 
gave the United States Olympic Committee the right to prohibit commercial and promotional uses of 
the word “Olympic” and related Olympic symbols. Inter alia, the statute provides Lanham Act 
remedies against any person who “uses for the purposes of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or 
services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition” the word 
“Olympic” or “Olympiad.” Id. § 220506. 
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As the Court found, the value of the term “Olympic” “was the product of 
the USOC’s ‘own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, 
and expense,’”3 and, as such, it was within Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers to reward the USOC with exclusive rights to use the word.4 By 
granting the USOC intellectual property protection in the use of a single 
word outside of the commercial sphere, regardless of any potential for 
consumer confusion, the High Court’s ruling consecrated Congress’s 
decision to extend to the USOC powers far beyond the traditional ambit 
of trademark law.5 In short, the decision marked a fundamental 
expansion in the gamut of intellectual property protections, despite the 
potential impact on the expressive rights of those wishing to use the term 
“Olympic” in noncommercial contexts. 
In recent years, such cases have spurred a wave of law review 
literature critiquing intellectual property jurisprudence for failing to 
appreciate the deleterious impact of trademark and copyright 
enforcement on the exercise of free speech rights.6 As the argument 
 
 3. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 533 (1987) (quoting 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)). 
 4. Id. at 534–35.  
 5. While trademark law provides intellectual property protection to certain phrases and even 
single words, such protection is unavailable to generic terms, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000), and is 
typically limited to cases where consumer confusion might result, id. § 1066 (allowing denial of a 
trademark application if the mark so resembles a previously registered mark that it would be likely 
“to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive”); accord id. § 1127. Of course, the consumer-
confusion rationale of trademark law has already begun to fade as the courts have expanded the 
reach of trademark protection in recent years, as states have granted anti-dilution protections to 
certain “strong” trademarks, see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 2005), and as 
Congress has amended the Lanham Act to include special anti-dilution protection for famous marks, 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 6. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 
903 (2002); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 323 (1997); 
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the Enclosure of 
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 366–67 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish 
Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001); Yochai Benkler, Through 
the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556–57 (1993); 
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147; 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property 
Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 1057 (2001); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Neil Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) [hereinafter 
Locating Copyright]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of 
Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000); L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., 
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typically goes, congressional acquiescence to regular copyright-term 
extensions and the expansion of trademark protection beyond the goal of 
consumer protection have enlarged copyright and trademark monopolies 
in a manner that has undermined the “uneasy truce”7 between intellectual 
property rights and the First Amendment. As a result, internal safeguards 
such as the fair-use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy8 are no 
longer adequate to protect vital free speech interests. Although a few 
scholars have argued otherwise,9 the weight of authority in the academy 
supports the view that a clash exists between intellectual property and 
First Amendment rights and that copyright and trademark monopolies 
must be more carefully circumscribed in order to protect expressive 
freedoms. 
At first glance, the courts appear to have taken a different view of the 
intersection of First Amendment and intellectual property rights by 
systematically dismissing the existence of any clash between the two 
bodies of law. For example, the possibility of a conflict between free 
speech rights and copyright has been so seldom acknowledged that only 
one appellate court—the Eleventh Circuit in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co.10—has ever explicitly applied the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause to constrain enforcement of a copyright.11 Moreover, in 
its most salient pronouncements on copyright law, the Supreme Court 
has explained away any clash between free speech rights and copyright 
by arguing that any tension can be handled through intrinsic limits on 
 
Copyright and Free Speech Rights, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003). 
 7. Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
529, 531 (2000). 
 8. The idea/expression dichotomy, a basic tenet of copyright doctrine, holds that only 
expressions, and not underlying ideas and facts upon which expressions may be based, may receive 
copyright protection. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (denying 
copyright protection to an alphabetical listing of residential phone numbers on the basis of the 
idea/expression dichotomy). 
 9. See, e.g., David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 
65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004); Raymond T. Nimmer, First Amendment Speech and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act: A Proper Marriage, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 1 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005). 
 10. 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a preliminary injunction issued by the 
district court to prevent publication of the Gone with the Wind parody, The Wind Done Gone, “was 
at odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior 
restraint on speech”). 
 11. Locating Copyright, supra note 6, at 3. 
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copyright, including fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy. As the 
Court explained in Eldred v. Ashcroft, “copyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards are generally adequate to address [any conflict with free 
speech rights].”12 Similarly, in rejecting a First Amendment argument in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Copyright Act already embodied First Amendment 
protections through its “distinction between copyrightable expression 
and noncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and 
comment traditionally afforded by fair use.”13 
Even more strikingly, the courts have uniformly rejected arguments 
that the anticircumvention provisions in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act14 violate the First Amendment by proscribing speech that 
would otherwise be available under copyright law’s fair-use defense.15 
Thus, courts have found no First Amendment encroachment even under 
digital rights management regimes that wholly deny any form of fair use 
to individuals.16 
The goal of this Article is not to rehash the extant literature on the 
weighty subject of the tension between two important bodies of law; law 
reviews are rife with compelling arguments which assess the threat to 
free speech rights from the expansion of intellectual property 
monopolies. Rather, by exploring the wide gulf that appears to exist 
between the academy and the courts on this vital issue, this Article 
examines how we might reduce the tension between First Amendment 
doctrine and copyright law in particular.17 
As I argue, both academics and the courts have grown increasingly 
concerned about the dominant influence of corporate interests in guiding 
 
 12. 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). It should be noted, however, that the Court did suggest that the 
D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it stated that copyright cases are categorically immune from 
First Amendment challenges. See id. 
 13. 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 
F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that “the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first 
amendment in the copyright field”). 
 14. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2000) (proscribing the circumvention of digital rights 
management technology that controls access to copyrighted works, the trafficking of such anti-
circumvention devices, and the circumvention of digital rights management technology that imposes 
limits on the use of copyrighted works, respectively). 
 15. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 16. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 
2004). 
 17. Although the tension between trademark and intellectual property law flagged in this 
Introduction is worthy of further analysis, it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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copyright law and the implications of this trend in the dissemination of 
knowledge; however, their responses have been different. Academics 
have framed the debate as a clash between the First Amendment and 
intellectual property law. Although courts have avoided such a 
categorization, they have not been altogether oblivious to the dangers in 
the unfettered expansion of copyright law. Indeed, a careful examination 
of jurisprudence in the intellectual property arena reflects judicial 
circumspection over the effect of intellectual property expansion on the 
ability of individuals to make speech. Courts have drawn a firm line on 
the idea/expression dichotomy; and, in other areas where they have had 
the discretion to formulate new balancing tests, First Amendment 
interests have played a role in constraining the scope of intellectual 
property rights. Nevertheless, courts have been unable to address fully 
the First Amendment concerns inherent in copyright law. 
This Article argues that the central obstacle in addressing the tension 
between copyright protection and free expression rights is not the 
existence of a vast ideological rift between the academy and the 
judiciary; rather, the central obstacle is structural. Simply put, the 
statutory scheme of the present copyright regime forces courts to choose 
between two extreme options: infringement or fair use. If courts find 
infringement, hefty statutory damages typically ensue—up to $150,000 
per willful act—that are often well in excess of actual damages. On the 
other hand, if courts find fair use, an unauthorized user of a copyrighted 
work is able to exploit, without permission or payment, the work of 
another with impunity, thereby free-riding on the creative success of the 
original author. This zero-sum regime has ultimately precluded courts 
from effectively balancing First Amendment and intellectual property 
considerations. 
Just as the modern torts revolution precipitated the evolution of 
comparative liability that overrode the harsh binary features of prior 
negligence doctrine, copyright law could benefit from the introduction of 
an intermediate liability option. Specifically, free expression issues 
become most pressing in the copyright arena when transformative uses—
uses that “add[] something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering [an original creative work] with new expression, 
meaning, or message”—are made of creative works.18 As a result, this 
 
 18. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The definition of what 
constitutes a transformative work is, of course, subject to great debate. As I argue, however, this is 
an issue the courts should more vigorously engage themselves in as it goes to the heart of the 
utilitarian rationale for copyright protection. See infra Part IV.C.2.a. For the purposes of the 
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Article proposes the creation of a third option in the liability calculus: 
transformative, or productive, uses of copyrighted works that would 
otherwise constitute infringements should be made exempt from 
statutory or actual damages. Such uses should be deemed, per se, 
noninfringing. However, commercial exploitation of transformative 
works would be subject to an accounting of profits—profits that would, 
as a default rule, be evenly split between the author of the original work 
and the transformative user. 
Several benefits would accrue from such an intermediate liability 
option. First, courts would be discharged from the harsh, draconian 
choice between massive infringement liability and fair use—a binary that 
has prevented courts from fully addressing the free-speech issues 
inherent in copyright enforcement. For transformative users of 
copyrighted works, liability would never exceed profitability; 
consequently, free expression rights would not be denied because of 
monetary concerns. This limitation of liability would in turn advance key 
First Amendment interests. Moreover, such an intermediate liability 
option also advances the original, utilitarian vision of the federal 
copyright system—the maximization of dissemination of creative works 
to the public so as to advance progress in the arts.19 Meanwhile, 
copyright owners would continue to receive reasonable payments for the 
commercial exploitation of their works. 
In making these arguments, Part II first explores the growing tension 
between the property rights granted through copyright law and the 
expressive rights secured through the First Amendment. Part III then 
examines how courts have addressed, and seemingly denied, the clash 
between free expression rights and intellectual property rights. 
Specifically, I argue that the natural-law aspects of the fair-use test have 
prevented courts from allowing most transformative uses, save parody, to 
escape infringement liability. This result not only harms progress in the 
arts—the basic goal of the copyright system—but also undermines free 
speech rights. Drawing from the California Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence on the right to publicity, I argue that a doctrinal alternative 
to copyright’s fair-use test would better promote progress in the arts and 
free expression. To this effect, Part IV begins by reviewing and assessing 
 
intermediate liability proposal, I draw upon the definition adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Campbell. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 19. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
Comment [RCC1]: CM 5.162 
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the virtues and shortcomings of several prominent proposals debated in 
the literature to date. Drawing upon this analysis, I then present an 
intermediate liability alternative for copyright infringement litigation that 
frees courts from the harsh infringement/fair-use binary of the current 
legal regime and thereby advances both expressive rights and the 
utilitarian goals of the copyright regime. 
II. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. The Growing Clash 
The modern notion of copyright infringement endorses an 
unflinching protection of the inherent property rights of an author in the 
fruits—both literal and nonliteral, reproductive and derivative—of her 
intellectual labor. This expansive first-author protection has had a 
detrimental impact on progress in the arts and caused a serious clash with 
rights to free expression. As Ray Patterson has observed, “freedom of 
speech depends in a large measure upon the existence of a public 
domain.”20 Indeed, the public domain provides the building blocks from 
which individuals can construct their own speech. But as the scope of 
intellectual property expands, the scope of available speech diminishes. 
Once upon a time, copyright looked very different from its modern 
analogue. As envisioned at the time of the Constitution, copyright laws 
served to prevent wholesale piracy, or slavish reproductions, of creative 
works as a part of the larger project of encouraging dissemination of 
creative works to the public. Thus, copyright was not a natural-rights 
doctrine that sought to protect the inherent interests of authors in the 
fruits of their creative labor; rather, it was a utilitarian doctrine that 
served to encourage publication of new and transformative works by 
granting limited monopoly rights as an economic incentive for such 
activity.21 
As a critical corollary to this original vision of copyright, 
transformative uses of another’s creative work were viewed as per se 
noninfringing—specifically, courts emphasized the degree to which such 
uses contributed to progress in the arts, the central goal of the copyright 
regime.22 Thus, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, and in the English 
 
 20. L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 444 (1998). 
 21. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 465 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 474–80. 
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jurisprudence that guided our own, courts considered whether a use was 
transformative as the central factor in the infringement calculus,23 and 
they uniformly deemed activities such as translation and abridgment per 
se noninfringing. Despite the fact that such results undermined the 
inherent property rights of authors in the fruits of their labor, courts felt 
that unauthorized translations, abridgements, and other transformative 
uses of copyright works advanced the ultimate goal of the copyright 
system—progress in the arts—more than would heavy natural-law 
protection.24 
However, the last century has witnessed a radical expansion in the 
scope of protections afforded copyright owners.25 As I have argued 
elsewhere, the advent of the fair-use test played a central role in this 
transformation by reintroducing natural-law elements to the infringement 
calculus.26 First enunciated in Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. 
Marsh,27 the fair-use balancing test is now codified in section 107 of the 
Copyright Act28 and balances at least four factors to determine when 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 652 (1834) (“An abridgement fairly 
done, is itself authorship, requires mind; and is not an infringement, no more than another work on 
the same subject.”); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (“To 
make a good translation of a work often requires more learning, talent and judgment, than was 
required to write the original. Many can transfer from one language to another, but few can translate. 
To call the translations of an author’s ideas and conceptions into another language, a copy of his 
book, would be an abuse of terms, and arbitrary judicial legislation.”); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 
171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) (finding that “[a] fair abridgment of any book is 
considered a new work, as to write it requires labor and exercise of judgment”); Newbery’s Case, 
(1773) 98 Eng. Rep. 913, 913 (Ch.) (finding that an abridgement constitutes “an act of understanding 
. . . in the nature of a new and meritorious work.”); Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 
(Ch.) (“[A]bridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper 
and print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them, and in many 
cases are extremely useful, though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the 
sense of an author.”); Burnett v. Chetwood, (1720) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009 (Ch.) (“[A] translation 
might not be the same with the reprinting [of] the original, on account that the translator has 
bestowed his care and pains upon it.”).  
 25. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1297–98 (1999) 
(“[Copyright has] transformed from an exclusive right to make copies, quite narrowly construed, to 
an exclusive right to significant reproductive use of the work in any form, not at all restricted to that 
in which it was embodied by the owner of the copyright. That transformation was signaled notably 
in the Copyright Act of 1976, which replaced the numerous particular provisions describing the 
copyright owner’s rights in the 1909 Act with five brief, unqualified provisions that cover just about 
any use of a copyrighted work other than private edification or enjoyment of it in the form in which 
it was published.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 26. Tehranian, supra note 21. 
 27. 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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someone can make use of a copyrighted work without permission from 
or payment to its owner: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for and value of the 
copyrighted work.29 Under the fair-use test, especially its second, third 
and fourth factors, the degree to which an alleged infringer was free-
riding on the creative labor of another became the central focus of courts 
in the infringement calculus.30 Thus, the emphasis of courts in 
determining infringement liability has shifted from what use is made of a 
copyrighted work (acknowledged only in the first fair-use factor) to how 
much is taken from a copyright work (assessed through the last three fair-
use factors). The result has been a vast expansion in copyright protection 
from its original ambit—the prohibition of slavish reproduction of 
someone’s creative work—to a natural-rights vision of copyright that 
seeks to protect the inherent property right of an author in her 
creations.31 
The consequences of this dramatic theoretical shift in the 
underpinnings of copyright law are numerous. Copyright law now 
protects not only against literal reproduction of a copyrighted work, but 
against nonliteral borrowing and unauthorized creation of derivative 
works. By the end of the nineteenth century, such uses as translation, 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Tehranian, supra note 21, at 484–87. 
 31. In Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514), for example, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe sued the author of an unauthorized German translation of her celebrated 
work, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, for copyright infringement. In rejecting Stowe’s claim, the Court found 
that the German translation was transformative—not a mere slavish reproduction—and that its 
creation took an act of great intellectual and creative energy: “To make a good translation of a 
work,” noted Justice Grier, “often requires more learning, talent and judgment, than was required to 
write the original. Many can transfer from one language to another, but few can translate. To call the 
translations of an author’s ideas and conceptions into another language, a copy of his book, would be 
an abuse of terms, and arbitrary judicial legislation.” Id. at 207. Thus, the Court dismissed the claims 
that the translation merely free-rode on Stowe’s intellectual efforts and the natural rights that 
stemmed from those efforts. In language that would stun modern observers, the Court deemed that 
[b]y the publication of Mrs. Stowe’s book, the creations of the genius and imagination of 
the author have become as much public property as those of Homer or Cervantes. (Uncle 
Tom and Topsy are as much publici juris as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.) All her 
conceptions and inventions may be used and abused by imitators, play-rights and 
poetasters. (They are no longer her own—those who have purchased her book, may 
clothe them in English doggerel, in German or Chinese prose. Her absolute dominion and 
property in the creations of her genius and imagination have been voluntarily 
relinquished.) 
Id. at 208 (internal citation omitted). 
Comment [RCC2]: CM 7.90 
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novelization, dramatization, and abridgement were deemed infringing.32 
With the promulgation of the 1976 Copyright Act, the breadth of 
derivative works protection grew even more dramatically: Congress 
adopted an expansive definition of what constituted a derivative work33 
and granted authors the exclusive right to prepare all derivatives of their 
copyrighted works.34 
On the constitutional front, however, expressive rights have also 
grown in scope. Over the past half-century, courts have expanded their 
reading of the First Amendment to incorporate entertainment and artistic 
creations as speech entitled to full constitutional protection.35 Ironically, 
however, the expanding ambit of copyright law has limited the ability of 
individuals to engage in numerous forms of speech. As a consequence, 
unprecedented liability has attached to a variety of artistic and 
transformative expressions drawing upon existing works, despite the 
extension of First Amendment protection to entertainment and artistic 
creations. The slightest unauthorized sample of a sound recording can 
result in a multimillion-dollar judgment, even if a significant and 
expressive new work of music is created through use of the sample.36 
 
 32. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (granting copyright owners 
the exclusive right to dramatize and translate their works); Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 
§ b, 35 Stat. 1075 (granting authors the exclusive right to “translate the copyrighted work into other 
language or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be 
a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange 
or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a 
work of art”). 
 33. Under the current Copyright Act, passed in 1976, a derivative work is  
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a “derivative work.”  
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 34. See id. § 106(2). 
 35. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557 (1995) (finding that a nonpolitical parade without an articulate or clear message constitutes 
protected speech under the First Amendment); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 
546 (1975) (finding that theatrical productions constitute speech protected under the First 
Amendment); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499–502 (1952) (holding, for the first time, that 
movies are protected as speech under the First Amendment); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 
510 (1948) (holding that low-brow writing is “as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the 
best of literature”). 
 36. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that any unauthorized sample of a sound recording, no matter how small, constitutes 
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Expressive art and writing that draw without permission on copyrighted 
images and characters to criticize or illuminate our values, assess our 
social institutions, satirize current events, or comment on our most 
notorious cultural symbols are similarly prohibited.37 
In channeling Ronald Dworkin, William Fisher has argued that any 
government bent on increasing the 
“complexity and depth of the forms of life open to” its subjects . . . [has 
an interest in] protect[ing] the culture’s language as a whole and its 
artistic vocabulary in particular “from structural debasement or 
decay”—both by preserving and making accessible to the public “a rich 
stock of illustrative and comparative collections” of art and by fostering 
“a tradition of artistic innovation.”38 
By encouraging the dissemination of creative works to the public, 
copyright law can advance these expressive interests. However, in its 
unyielding restraint of transformative uses, especially at a time when 
technology is radically expanding the palette of artistic possibilities, the 
modern copyright regime limits the artistic vocabulary and therefore 
serves to suppress significant expressive interests. At a minimum, 
therefore, there is a significant tension between copyright protection and 
free speech.39 
B. The Inadequacy of Fair Use in Protecting Free Expression 
Moreover, fair use—the ostensible vehicle for protecting expressive 
rights and the public domain in copyright jurisprudence—has failed to do 
 
copyright infringement); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993); Grand Upright 
Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 37. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that a satire of the O.J. Simpson trial based on The Cat in the Hat infringed Dr. Seuss’s 
copyright); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that modern artist Jeffrey 
Koons’s kitschy mutilation of a photograph featuring a couple and some puppies that served as a 
satire of suburban American aesthetic sensibilities infringed the copyright of the original 
photographer); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (finding that a book that analyzed, mocked, and satirized all things Star Trek violated 
Paramount’s copyright in the television show); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 
955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that a humorous guidebook to the Seinfeld series violated 
Castle Rock’s copyright in the television show). 
 38. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1753 (1988) (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Panel Discussion: Art as a Public Good, 9 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 143, 153–56 (1985)). 
 39. The derivative rights doctrine is not alone in aggravating the tension between copyright 
law and expressive rights. The tension has been further exacerbated by the fair-use test and the ways 
in which it has been applied in recent years. See infra Part III.B. 
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its job. Simply put, under the fair-use test, courts cannot give free speech 
interests appropriate weight. The nature of the fair-use test, which 
envisions copyright as a strong natural-law property interest, precludes 
such balancing. Far from checking the scope of copyright protections in 
order to protect the expressive interests of the public, therefore, the fair-
use test has actually served to expand, rather than diminish, the copyright 
monopoly, thereby undermining the utilitarian goals of the Copyright 
Clause.40 Specifically, the fair-use test prevents many forms of 
transformative use from escaping liability from copyright infringement.41 
Hence, modern copyright law has impeded original and socially useful 
speech. At the same time, other elements of the fair-use test have 
unjustifiably suppressed free speech interests. 
First, the expressive rights of a copyright user, embodied in the 
transformative-use doctrine, constitute only a meager fraction of the fair-
use test, playing a role in only one of the section 107 factors—“the 
purpose and character of the use.”42 On a rhetorical level, transformative 
use has grown increasingly important in the fair-use calculus in recent 
years. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,43 the Supreme Court extensively cited 
and adopted the reasoning of Judge Pierre Leval’s influential article, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard,44 wherein Leval advocates making 
transformative use a stronger consideration in the fair-use test.45 
 
 40. Several critical facts indicate that our federal copyright regime, as envisioned by the 
Framers, sought to grant individuals a limited monopoly in their creative works as a means to 
encourage creation and dissemination of original works to the public, not to recognize an inherent 
property interest to which individuals are entitled over the fruits of their intellectual labors. First, the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8, and the first Copyright 
Act, which was entitled “An Act for the encouragement of learning,” 1 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), are grounded in explicitly utilitarian language. Secondly, under 
the original copyright regime, protection was offered only to published works, therefore invoking an 
explicit quid pro quo that extended the benefits of the copyright monopoly to creative works that 
were actually disseminated to the public. Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), explicitly rejected the continued viability of the common-law 
copyright regime grounded in natural-rights principles. See Tehranian, supra note 21, at 470–74. 
 41. See Tehranian, supra note 21, at 492–504. 
 42. 107 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). 
 43. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). 
 44. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1990). 
 45. The Campbell Court, citing Leval’s work, emphasized the importance of transformative 
use in the copyright infringement calculus and the need to determine whether “the new work merely 
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” 510 
U.S. at 579 (internal citations omitted). 
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However, in all but the case of parody, transformative uses have not 
found solace in the fair-use doctrine.46 The courts have generally 
permitted unlicensed transformative uses solely for modalities such as 
parody, which inherently necessitate a derivative user conjure up the 
original work.47 As the Campbell Court concluded, “Parody needs to 
mimic an original to make its point . . . whereas satire can stand on its 
own two feet.48 This formulation of the transformative-use component of 
the section 107 balancing test is laden in the discourse of property rights, 
allowing borrowing only when conditions require it. Such a view casts 
fair use, rather than copyright, as a privilege.49 
Moreover, even if an individual is fairly confident that a particular 
expressive use is protected as fair use, one can never be sure: the 
jurisprudence in the fair-use arena is notoriously unpredictable.50 The 
line between idea and expression, which bears directly on fair-use 
matters,51 is particularly problematic. As Learned Hand once conceded, 
“Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever 
can.”52 Moreover, by the fair-use statute’s own admissions, the four 
factors listed are not comprehensive.53 There is also little consistency in 
 
 46. Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (finding fair use in 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy 
Orbison’s song Pretty Woman), with Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding no fair 
use in Jeff Koons’s satirical appropriation of Art Rogers’s Puppies photograph). As Naomi Voegtli 
argues, under the fair-use test, appropriationist works are unlikely to survive a fair use defense:  
First, the purpose of the use is often commercial; second, appropriative works generally 
do not fall within a category of works for which the courts have traditionally granted fair 
use . . . ; third, appropriative works often take a substantial portion of the original and/or 
a portion of the original that is considered most valuable; and fourth, many appropriative 
works appeal to a different audience, and thus have little effect on the market of the 
original. . . . [Courts often] presume[] a negative economic effect based on the 
commercial nature of defendant’s appropriative work.  
Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1227–28 (1997). 
 47. See Tehranian, supra note 21. 
 48. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81. 
 49. See Tehranian, supra note 21. 
 50. See Leval, supra note 44, at 1105–06. 
 51. The idea/expression dichotomy bears heavily on the second factor of the fair-use test, 
which judges the nature of the copyrighted work, granting greater fair use rights to factual (idea-
based) materials and lesser fair use rights to fanciful (expression-based) materials. See 17 U.S.C. § 
107(2) (2000). 
 52. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 53. “The factors contained in Section 107 are merely by way of example, and are not an 
exhaustive enumeration.” 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.05[A] (2005). See also Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 
(2d Cir. 1998) (noting that “the four listed statutory factors in § 107 guide but do not control [a 
court’s] fair use analysis”). 
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the way that the various four (or more) factors are weighed.54 Wildly 
disparate outcomes on similar fact patterns have resulted, making 
copyright cases hard to decipher and reconcile.55 For example, as 
Rebecca Tushnet points out, “After decades of litigation, it is still 
difficult to tell when and whether one can photocopy copyrighted 
materials, even for scientific research.”56 
The capricious outcome of fair-use cases has, of course, been 
previously observed.57 However, it is particularly troubling in light of the 
free speech implications involved (and the courts’ denials thereof). It is 
axiomatic that cases implicating free speech interests require heightened 
judicial scrutiny of legislative action and acute concern over the potential 
chilling effects that vague rules and overbroad regulations can have on 
the exercise of First Amendment rights.58 However, when such issues 
ostensibly fall under the aegis of intellectual property law, the impact of 
overbroad regulations and vague rules on the chilling of speech are 
frequently ignored.59 There is little doubt that the nebulous fair-use 
standards have prompted and will continue to prompt self-censorship in 
the private realm. Potential infringers will be unwilling and unable to 
bear the substantial costs of litigation as well as the risk of liability, even 
 
 54. One exception, perhaps, is the fourth factor—market harm—which the Supreme Court 
has mysteriously deemed the most important factor in the balancing test. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 238 (1990). 
 55. See, e.g., BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 8.2 (noting that the “exact contours [of the fair use doctrine] are difficult 
to define precisely”). 
 56. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in 
Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications 
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2000). Despite the explicit text of the 1976 Copyright Act, which 
states that “the fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as . . . teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright,” 17 
U.S.C. § 107, the courts have still managed to find a plethora of instances where use of a 
copyrighted work for teaching, research, or scholarship constitutes infringement. See, e.g., Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994); Duffy v. Penguin Books, 4 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); 
Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1993); Basic Books, Inc. v. 
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 57. See Tushnet, supra note 56, at 24. 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting the 
application of heightened scrutiny to government action implicating First Amendment rights).  
 59. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual 
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1867–68 (1991); Jessica Litman, 
Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 612–13 (1997); 
Tushnet, supra note 56, at 24. 
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where it does not or should not exist.60 The result not only suppresses 
free speech but also hinders the progress of the arts. This risk is 
particularly exacerbated by the massive statutory damages61 available 
under copyright law—up to $150,000 per act of willful infringement.62 
The exorbitance of these penalties inhibits anyone but the most bold and 
well-financed potential infringers from relying upon a fair-use defense.63 
Finally, fair use is an affirmative defense. Prior to the development 
of the fair-use doctrine, courts viewed acts of borrowing, if they were 
sufficiently transformative, as noninfringing uses.64 In other words, the 
burden of persuasion remained on the copyright holder to demonstrate 
that the work was infringing and not transformative. Under Folsom and 
its progeny, once a prima facie showing of borrowing was made, the 
burden then shifted to the alleged infringer to demonstrate that their use 
was excusable. Thus, a party justifying use bears the burden of 
persuasion at trial on all issues involved in a fair-use analysis.65 Despite 
the plaintiff’s alleged burden of showing a likelihood of success on the 
merits to obtain injunctive relief, some courts have even placed the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant for any fair-use defense at the 
preliminary injunction phase.66 Again, this rule stands in stark contrast to 
the typical judicial tack when dealing with free speech interests: prior 
restraints are strongly disfavored and presumptively invalid.67 Given the 
social utility of transformative uses in advancing the arts, it is unusual 
 
 60. Coombe, supra note 59, at 1868 (“Faced with the threat of legal action, most local 
parodists, political activists, and satirical bootleggers will cease their activities.”). 
 61. Doubtlessly, these statutory damages incorporate a punitive component; moreover, 
statutory damages are frequently far in excess of actual damages. As a result, one wonders whether, 
given the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence limiting punitive damages on due process grounds, 
see BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996), copyright’s statutory damages provisions may violate 
due process rights in many cases.  
 62. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000). 
 63. For a small, but emblematic, example, see Fred S. McChesney, Just Let Me Read Some of 
That Rock ‘n Roll Music, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 149 (1998) (describing the reluctance of publishers to 
allow the quotation of music lyrics, no matter how short, in academic books for fear of legal action 
against them). 
 64. See supra notes 24, 31. 
 65. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
 66. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(resting the burden of proof with respect to a fair use claim in a preliminary injunction hearing on the 
defendant); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 335 (D.N.J. 
2002); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc. 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 67. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (deeming prior restraints invalid in all 
but the most extreme circumstances). 
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that these burdens are not reversed, especially since First Amendment 
rights are involved. 
 
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE CLASH 
All told, the ambit of copyright protection has expanded dramatically 
over the past two centuries. However, copyrighted works do not merely 
represent a form of intellectual property; they also constitute the chief 
vehicle for the expression and transmission of political, artistic, social, 
and cultural messages. A growing tension between copyright and speech 
rights has therefore emerged. Meanwhile, as a result of its vindication of 
natural-law copyright constructs, its minimal consideration of 
transformative use, its limits as an affirmative defense, and its notorious 
ambiguity, the fair-use doctrine—the public-interest mechanism 
responsible for checking the copyright monopoly—has failed to protect 
expressive rights adequately. In spite of these circumstances, however, 
the judicial response to the tension between copyright and expressive 
rights has been mixed.  
One strain of copyright jurisprudence evokes a discourse of denial 
that, upon cursory examination, suggests a lack of judicial appreciation 
for the free-speech implications ubiquitous throughout the copyright 
landscape. However, as I argue, a more nuanced examination of recent 
copyright-related jurisprudence reveals concern for expressive interests 
with respect to a number of issues, including the drawing of the 
idea/expression line, the shaping of equitable remedies in infringement 
suits, and the circumscription of neighboring doctrines such as the right 
of publicity. Ultimately, however, the harsh infringement/fair-use choice 
that courts face in infringement suits has foreclosed full consideration of 
the First Amendment interests frequently at stake in copyright litigation. 
A. The Clash Denied: Free Expression and the Hegemony of the 
Property Rights Discourse 
Copyright impedes free speech rights. Simply put, “Copyright law is 
a serious restriction on speakers’ ability to express themselves the way 
they want.”68 After all, copyright laws can prevent you from “writing, 
painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating what you 
 
 68. Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment 
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2434 (1998). 
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please.”69 While good justifications may exist for the limitations that 
copyright places on free speech,70 the federal courts have seemingly 
resolved any conflict by denying the existence of any clash between the 
intellectual property monopolies and expressive rights instead of 
balancing and addressing the tensions between the two bodies of law. As 
Michael Birnhack notes, rather than acknowledging the strain between 
the First Amendment and copyright legislation, courts have internalized 
the conflict, confining it to the borders of copyright law.71 
1. Judicial denial? 
Indeed, courts have repeatedly justified the categorization of 
copyrighted works as property rather than speech by arguing that the 
fair-use provisions developed at common law and codified by Congress 
in the 1976 Copyright Act,72 as well as the idea/expression dichotomy, 
subsume any First Amendment concerns raised by the enforcement of 
copyright. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rarely acknowledged the 
intersection of First Amendment and copyright jurisprudence. Over the 
past thirty-five years, for example, the Supreme Court has decided five 
cases on the relatively rare activity of flag burning, but only four 
intellectual property cases touching on the First Amendment.73 More 
importantly, the Supreme Court has seemingly denied any tension 
between intellectual property and free expression rights when dealing 
with such issues. Eldred v. Ashcroft illustrates such a denial. 
In Eldred, the petitioner argued that the Copyright Term Extension 
Act,74 which granted a twenty-year extension in all subsisting 
 
 69. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 6, at 165–66.  
 70. For example, there may be expressive value to the act of reproducing your favorite book 
in whole so that you can share copies of the book with everyone you meet. However, such an action 
would nevertheless constitute a copyright violation. Simply put, the impact that such an action has 
on the economic incentives for creation and dissemination of the copyrighted work outweighs the 
expressive value of reproducing the work with impunity. 
 71. Michael Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1275 (2003). 
 72. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 73. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 698. Compare United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 
(1990), Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), Smith 
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), and Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), with Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 
(1985) (copyright), S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) 
(deciding the issue of property right in the word “Olympics” as used for commercial purposes), and 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (right of publicity).  
 74. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 302(c), 304. 
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copyrights, delayed the entrance of expressive materials into the public 
domain, thereby affecting the First Amendment rights of the petitioner 
and subjecting the statute to heightened judicial review.75 In response, 
the Court denied any clash between copyright monopolies and free 
speech rights. Instead, the Court emphasized the compatibility of the 
two, noting blithely that “the [First] Amendment and the Copyright 
Clause were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates the Framers’ 
view that copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free 
speech principles.”76 
Even if the Court’s logic regarding proximity is sound, history 
indicates how far we have deviated in the past two centuries from the 
Framers’ notion of copyright (and, for that matter, free speech).77 
Copyright, at the time of the Framers, was a utilitarian doctrine that 
proscribed wholesale reproduction of texts in order to ensure that 
publishers would possess the necessary economic incentives to 
disseminate creative works.78 Copyright terms lasted a total of fourteen 
years, the preparation of derivative works was not one of the exclusive 
rights conferred by the copyright monopoly, and transformative use of a 
copyrighted work (including the acts of abridgement and translation) was 
considered a per se noninfringing activity. Thus, while copyright, as 
understood by the Framers, may not have clashed with free speech 
principles, this says precious little about whether our modern notion of 
copyright might. The Eldred majority thoroughly ignores the dramatic 
expansion in the scope of copyright protection over the past two hundred 
years.79 
Moreover, the Eldred Court internalized the conflict, suggesting that 
any potential clash between free speech and copyright could be handled 
through intrinsic limits on copyright, including fair use and the 
idea/expression dichotomy: “[C]opyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards are generally adequate to address [any conflict with free 
speech rights].”80 These words echo the opinion in Harper & Row some 
 
 75. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94. 
 76. Id. at 190. 
 77. See supra Part II (discussing the historical evolution of theories underlying copyright 
protection). 
 78. See Tehranian, supra note 21. 
 79. See supra Part II (documenting the expansion in copyright protections over the past two 
centuries). 
 80. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. Importantly, however, the Court did suggest that the D.C. 
Circuit spoke too broadly when it stated that copyright cases are categorically immune from First 
Amendment challenges. Id. 
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two decades earlier, when, in rejecting a separate First Amendment 
argument, the Supreme Court ruled that the Copyright Act already 
embodied First Amendment protections through its “distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the 
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair 
use.”81 With this guidance from the Supreme Court, it is not surprising 
that appellate courts have rarely acknowledged any clash between the 
First Amendment and copyright law.82 
The courts, of course, are not alone in this denial. Melville Nimmer 
also explains away the tension between copyright and free speech by 
arguing that the conflict is “generally ameliorated by copyright’s role in 
incentivizing new expression and by copyright’s ‘internal safety valves,’ 
copyright law doctrines that limit the scope and duration of copyright 
holder rights.”83 A recent article in the Yale Law Journal is similarly 
revealing.84 In the piece, Paul M. Schwartz and William Michael 
Treanor assess the level of judicial scrutiny that copyright legislation 
should face. They conclude that courts should apply rational basis review 
since copyright constitutes constitutional property.85 Remarkably, the 
authors never acknowledge that copyright frequently implicates free 
speech issues and constitutes limited monopoly rights over our cultural 
currency, thereby making it different from other forms of property; in 
their lengthy article, the authors never once mention the First 
Amendment, and they refer only once to the notion of free speech. Thus, 
the authors entirely ignore the free speech considerations ubiquitous 
throughout the copyright landscape. The repeated categorization of 
copyright as property has enabled blithe dismissal of the reality that 
copyrighted works constitute the chief vehicle through which individuals 
convey speech and exercise their First Amendment rights. 
 
 81. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560; see also New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & 
Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that “the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of 
first amendment in the copyright field”). 
 82. See Locating Copyright, supra note 6, at 3. 
 83. Id. at 4 (explaining Melville B. Nimmer’s article but noting that the potential tension 
between the First Amendment protections and copyright, as Nimmer explains it, made much more 
sense in the 1970s, when it was first noted, see Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the 
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186–1204 
(1970)); see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the 
Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 289–99 (1979).  
 84. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term 
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003). 
 85. See id. 
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2. The triumph of natural-law copyright 
What is particularly significant about the dismissal of the unresolved 
clash between copyright and free speech is the way in which it is laden in 
the discourse of property rights, signaling the hegemony of a natural-
rights vision of copyright over an instrumentalist view and the 
concomitant immunization of copyright law from First Amendment 
scrutiny. There is no clash because, as the district court in Eldred v. Reno 
wrote, “there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted 
works of others.”86 Similarly, in only somewhat more demure language, 
the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft contended that “[t]he First 
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to 
make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the 
right to make other people’s speeches.”87 With this pronouncement, 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, espoused a sharply natural-
rights vision of copyright by drawing a clear distinction between the 
right we have to make our “own speech” under the First Amendment and 
our significantly curtailed ability to borrow “other people’s speeches.”88 
The notion that there is an easy differentiation between one’s own 
speech and the speech of others is, however, an assumption fraught with 
trouble because all copyrighted speech inevitably builds upon the speech 
of others. As Benjamin Kaplan notes, “Education  
. . . proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and ‘progress,’ if it is not entirely 
an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying.”89 The creative 
process is inherently iterative. As Jessica Litman has eloquently argued: 
All authorship is fertilized by the work of prior authors, and the echoes 
of old work in new work extend beyond ideas and concepts to a wealth 
of expressive details. Indeed, authorship is the transformation and 
recombination of expression into new molds, the recasting and revision 
of details into different shapes. What others have expressed, and the 
ways they have expressed it, are the essential building blocks of any 
creative medium. If an author is successful at what she does, then 
something she creates will alter the landscape a little. We may not 
know who she is, or how what she created has varied, if only slightly, 
the way things seem to look, but those who follow her will necessarily 
 
 86. 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 87. 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. 
 89. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1966). 
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tread on a ground distorted by her vision. The use of the work of other 
authors in one’s own work inheres in the authorship process.90 
Moreover, while there may be little doubt that in some cases an 
accused infringer is merely making the speech of others (as in Eldred, 
where the accused infringer adopted, word-for-word, the writings of 
others), there are a multitude of instances, including derivative-works 
cases, where an accused infringer has combined the fruit of another’s 
intellectual labor with her own to create something new and original.91 
Such uses not only muddy the notion of speech ownership, they can also 
contribute to progress in the arts.92 
All told, the denial of the clash between copyright and free 
expression has shielded copyright from First Amendment challenges. 
Thus, in the realm of judicial review, copyrighted speech has received 
preferred treatment, as it is considered immune from Bose standards,93 
which require that cases implicating free speech rights have the record 
reviewed de novo by appellate bodies.94 This outcome is quite surprising, 
for, as Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell note, “The argument that 
copyright law should be immune from standard First Amendment 
procedural rules because it protects property rights strikes us as a non 
sequitur. Free speech guarantees can’t be avoided simply by 
characterizing a speech restriction as an ‘intellectual property law.’”95 
Such conceptual machinations, however, do occur under existing 
jurisprudence and result in a much more expansive and pro-plaintiff 
vision of copyright infringement. 
B. The Clash Acknowledged: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 
Misappropriation, Injunctive Relief, and the Right of Publicity 
Contrary to the pessimism of some observers, however, there are 
areas in which the courts have acknowledged and addressed, albeit 
unevenly,96 the clash between free speech principles and intellectual 
property rights. For example, in delimiting the idea/expression 
dichotomy, meting out infringement relief, and shaping the 
 
 90. Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 243–44 (1991). 
 91. See, for example, the cases cited supra note 37. 
 92. See infra Part IV.C. 
 93. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 2445.  
 96. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 6, at 167–68, 237 n.403. 
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misappropriation and right of publicity doctrines at common law, the 
courts have explicitly addressed First Amendment concerns presented by 
expanding intellectual property protections. However, in each of these 
instances, the courts have possessed a strong degree of structural 
discretion and flexibility at their disposal. 
1. Protecting the right to use factual information in speech 
One such area of acknowledgement is the stern divide on the 
idea/expression dichotomy established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.97 In 
this foundational case, Rural Telephone Services claimed copyright in its 
telephone directory, which alphabetically listed phone numbers in 
several northwest Kansas communities.98 Despite the great labor and 
investment required to produce the Rural white pages, the Court found 
no subsisting copyright.99 The Court therefore rejected the Lockean 
sweat-of-the-brow theory of copyright by denying intellectual property 
protection to any unoriginal compilation of facts: “[C]opyright assures 
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to 
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. . . . ‘No 
author may copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to those 
aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the 
author’s originality.’”100 Feist thereby enervated the natural-rights 
position that individuals are entitled to intellectual property rights in the 
fruits of their labor, even in the absence of creativity and originality. First 
Amendment concerns illuminated the decision, as the Court recognized 
that unfettered access to basic information played a crucial role in news 
reporting and other factual speech. As the Supreme Court has noted 
elsewhere, careful enforcement of the idea/expression dichotomy helps 
to “strike a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still 
protecting an author’s expression.”101 
Courts have expressed similar free speech concerns in their diligent 
efforts to reign in attempts to use misappropriation claims to usurp quasi-
 
 97. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 98. Id. at 342–44. 
 99. Id. at 364. 
 100. Id. at 349–50 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
547–48 (1985)) (citations omitted).  
 101. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
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copyright protection for facts. The misappropriation cause of action 
gained legal recognition with the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in 
International News Service v. Associated Press (INS), which granted 
news organizations temporary ownership of factual information in order 
to preserve their incentive to expend resources on news-gathering 
without fear of having rivals free ride on the information by scooping 
them without payment.102 Specifically, the INS ‘hot news’ action 
escaped preemption under the Copyright Act and its dedication of factual 
data to the public domain.103 
Subsequent courts, however, have rebuked numerous efforts to 
extend the ‘hot news’ rule to other circumstances. In National Basketball 
Association v. Motorola, Inc.,104 for example, the Second Circuit 
rejected the argument that the defendant’s transmission of basketball 
scores to its pager customers should give rise to an INS-style 
misappropriation action.105 As the court held, the Copyright Act and its 
reservation of factual information to the public domain preempted such 
an action.106 Most courts have taken a similarly restrictive view of the 
circumstances that would warrant grant of copyright-like protection to 
data by limiting cognizable misappropriation actions to sets of facts 
almost identical to INS.107 
2. Protecting the dissemination of infringing creative speech 
Courts have also raised First Amendment concerns in granting 
injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases. Injunctive relief is 
discretionary, not mandatory, under the Copyright Act.108 As a result, 
courts can carefully scrutinize the situations in which they will grant it, 
implicitly and even explicitly weighing First Amendment issues in the 
decision. In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,109 the Eleventh 
Circuit expressly invoked First Amendment considerations in 
 
 102. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 105. Id. at 853–54.  
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing how a cause of action based on defendant’s misappropriation of the product of plaintiff’s 
extensive labors for use in direct competition against plaintiff was preempted as the cause of action 
did not require time-sensitivity of plaintiff’s work product required under INS “hot news” 
exception). 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000). 
 109. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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overturning a preliminary injunction issued by a district court to enjoin 
the publication of The Wind Done Gone, an allegedly infringing parody 
of Gone With the Wind. In strongly worded free speech language, the 
court found that injunctive relief “was at odds with the shared principles 
of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior restraint 
on speech.”110 
While other Circuits have not been as explicit, First Amendment 
considerations have influenced decisions to deny injunctive relief in 
cases of otherwise clear infringement. In Abend v. MCA, Inc.,111 for 
example, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendants’ movie Rear 
Window violated the copyright that Abend held in the underlying story. 
Significantly, however, the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin the continued 
distribution of Rear Window by recognizing its artistic achievements and 
the public’s interest in viewing the celebrated work. The court concluded 
that these “compelling equitable considerations”112 weighed against 
enjoining distribution of the film. In reviewing the case, the Supreme 
Court declined the opportunity to reconsider the injunction issue.113 Four 
years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court cited to Abend 
in cautioning courts that public access considerations weigh against the 
automatic grant of injunctive relief, even where infringement is well 
established.114 
The High Court’s scrutiny of injunctive relief in intellectual property 
cases was not unique to Campbell and the parody issue. Almost three 
decades ago, in Zacchini, the Supreme Court found that Zacchini (the 
“Human Cannonball”) could recover damages against a local television 
station for broadcasting his entire act on the evening news.115 However, 
in so holding, the majority distinguished between Zacchini’s right to be 
paid for use of his performance (at issue in the case) versus his right to 
injunctive relief (not at issue in the case).116 As the Court hinted, the 
 
 110. Id. at 1277. 
 111. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
 112. Id. at 1478. 
 113. Stewart, 495 U.S. 207. 
 114. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (“Because the fair 
use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in 
cases involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also wish to bear in mind that the goals 
of the copyright law, ‘to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ . . . are not 
always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone 
beyond the bounds of fair use.” (quoting Leval, supra note 44, at 1134) (citation omitted)). 
 115. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 116. Id. at 573–74. 
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latter would trigger significant concerns over public access to legitimate 
news stories.117 
3. Limiting the right of publicity on First Amendment grounds: Comedy 
III’s transformative-use approach 
Recent jurisprudence on the right of publicity—which grants 
individuals copyright-like protection in the commercial use of their 
name, voice, or likeness—has explicitly acknowledged the clash between 
free speech rights and intellectual property laws,118 and has even sought 
to address the clash through an increased emphasis on transformative 
use. Most prominently, the California Supreme Court has squarely 
identified the growing tension between the First Amendment and state 
statutes granting publicity rights to celebrities. The approach of the 
California courts to this issue provides important guidance on how the 
judiciary can better reconcile the tension between free speech rights and 
copyright protection. 
After wrestling with the vast expansion of celebrity publicity rights 
in the past few decades, the California Supreme Court has developed a 
test to address the First Amendment issues raised by the rights. The 
court’s ruling in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.119 
represents the opening salvo in this enterprise. In the case, Comedy III 
Productions, the registered owner of all intellectual properties once held 
by The Three Stooges, sued Gary Saderup, an artist who had made a 
charcoal drawing of The Three Stooges and had then reproduced the 
drawing for a series of lithographs and T-shirts that he sold to the general 
public.120 Comedy III claimed that the lithographs and T-shirts violated 
 
 117. Id. (“An entertainer such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread 
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit of such publication. Indeed, in the 
present case petitioner did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation 
for the broadcast in the form of damages.”). Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s decision to deny an en 
banc rehearing in New Era v. Henry Holt, the entire Second Circuit acknowledged the impropriety 
of automatically granting injunctive relief, even in instances of clear infringement. As both the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in the case recognized, public access concerns reflective of First 
Amendment values caution against enjoining public distribution of infringing works. See New Era 
Publ’ns Int’l, APS v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1989) (concurring and 
dissenting opinions), denying reh’g en banc to 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 118. See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: 
A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving 
Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. 
L. REV. 836 (1983). 
 119. 21 P.3d 797 (2001). 
 120. Id. at 800–01. 
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the Stooge’s right to publicity, as they constituted an unauthorized 
reproduction of the likeness of The Three Stooges. 
Right away, the discourse of the court stands in stark contrast to the 
existing jurisprudence in the intellectual property arena. The opening 
words of the opinion read: “A California statute grants the right of 
publicity . . . . The United States Constitution prohibits the states from 
abridging, among other fundamental rights, freedom of speech. In the 
case at bar, we resolve a conflict between these two provisions.”121 Such 
an explicit acknowledgement of a clash between intellectual property 
protections and free speech rights stands in direct opposition to the tack 
taken by the United States Supreme Court in such cases as Eldred v. 
Ashcroft and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.122 
According to the California Supreme Court, the right of publicity 
threatens core free speech values on two levels. First, the right of 
publicity can impede robust public discourse and debate since celebrities 
take on public meaning. Thus, the appropriation of their likeness “may 
have important uses in uninhibited debate on public issues, particularly 
debates about culture and values.”123 Second, the right of publicity can 
impede numerous means of personal expression and self-actualization. 
Since “celebrities take on personal meanings to many individuals . . . the 
creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an important avenue of 
individual expression.”124 Celebrities, as core components of our cultural 
currency and symbols of individual aspirations, group identities, and 
values, are a part of the common language of an increasingly networked 
and interdependent global economy. 
With these observations, the Comedy III court then determined the 
best way to balance celebrity publicity rights with First Amendment 
rights. The court first considered, but rejected, adoption of the Copyright 
Act’s fair-use test,125 choosing instead to adopt a transformative-use 
 
 121. Id. at 799. As the Comedy III court went on to state, “The state’s interest in preventing 
the outright misappropriation of . . . intellectual property by others is not automatically trumped by 
the interest in free expression or dissemination of information; rather . . . the state law interest and 
the interest in free expression must be balanced, according to the relative importance of the interests 
at stake.” Id. at 806. 
 122. See supra Part III.A. 
 123. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 803.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 807–08. Of course, under section 107 of the Copyright Act, federal courts are 
bound to consider the four-part fair-use balancing test, though they are likely free to add additional 
factors to the calculus. See supra note 55. By contrast, the California courts are not bound by the 
fair-use test when considering rights of publicity. 
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inquiry. The court’s analysis on this point is particularly significant. 
Unauthorized uses of celebrity likenesses are protected by the First 
Amendment so long as sufficient creative elements have been added to 
transform the use into more than an imitation. The court reasoned that 
“[a]nother way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is 
one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or 
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.”126 Oddly enough, the threshold 
inquiry recalls that of copyright cases from the early days of the 
Republic: a court must determine whether “the work in question adds 
significant creative elements so as to be transformed into something 
more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”127 
In Comedy III, the court concluded that there was insufficient 
(virtually no) transformative effect in Saderup’s drawings.128 The facts 
of the case therefore warranted no limit in the application of the right of 
publicity on free speech grounds. However, the court has subsequently 
used the Comedy III test in other cases to curtail publicity rights on the 
basis of the First Amendment. 
For example, in 2003, the court drew on Comedy III to vindicate DC 
Comics’ use of the Winter Brothers’ likeness in the Autumn Brothers 
cartoon characters.129 The Autumn Brothers appeared in two editions of 
the Jonah Hex comic book series and were depicted as half-human, half-
worm creatures who, like the Winters, were albinos, had long hair, and 
were named Johnny and Edgar.130 The court found that the Autumn 
Brother characters possessed significant creative elements that rendered 
them more than mere likenesses or imitations of the Winter Brothers.131 
Additionally, the cartoon characters were part of a “larger story, which is 
itself quite expressive.”132 Consequently, DC Comics’ use of the Winter 
Brothers’ likeness was transformative and noninfringing. 
 
 126. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
 127. Id. at 799. It is significant to note that the Comedy III decision is not without its 
problems. Most centrally, as Eugene Volokh argues, the Comedy III court uses at least three rather 
different definitions in the course of its opinion to determine what constitutes transformative use. See 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 916–17 
(2003). 
 128. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811. 
 129. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
 130. Id. at 476. 
 131. Id. at 479. 
 132. Id. 
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Significantly, and contrary to modern copyright jurisprudence, the 
Comedy III test embraces an expansive vision of transformative use, 
recognizing that such noninfringing uses are not limited to the realm of 
parody—a position contrary to that frequently taken by federal courts in 
the copyright context.133 The First Amendment lies at the heart of this 
analysis: “[T]ransformative elements or creative contributions that 
require First Amendment protection are not confined to parody and can 
take many forms, from factual reporting  
. . . to fictionalized portrayal . . . , from heavy-handed lampooning  
. . . to subtle social criticism.”134 The Comedy III court reasoned that 
“because celebrities take on public meaning, the appropriation of their 
likenesses may have important uses in uninhibited debate on public 
issues, particularly debates about culture and values.”135 
This rationale applies with equal, if not greater, vigor to copyrighted 
works. The appropriation of copyrighted works can play an important 
role in uninhibited debate on public, especially cultural, issues. Since 
copyrighted works take on personal meanings to many individuals, their 
appropriation can also form an important avenue for individual 
expression. Even more significantly, the appropriation of copyrighted 
works can bolster the entire purpose of copyright law—the progress of 
arts—by introducing new and important creative works into the public 
sphere. Copyrighted works are not merely a form of property; they are 
also a form of speech. Indeed, in the digital era, they constitute the 
primary vessel through which individuals convey their social and 
political messages. If a fundamentally natural-law based doctrine such as 
publicity rights (which protects the inherent right of celebrities in their 
name and likeness) must be delimited by First Amendment concerns 
through a transformative-use test, then it makes sense to do so with 
copyright law—law that emanates from the utilitarian bent and 
instrumentalist language of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause that 
empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”136 
The California Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on the right of 
publicity reveals that, contrary to some academic suggestions, courts are 
 
 133. See supra Part III.B. 
 134. Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797, 809 (2001). 
 135. Id. at 803. 
 136. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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not oblivious to the perilous effect that expansions in intellectual 
property protections can have on expressive rights. Unfettered by the 
statutory shackles of copyright’s fair-use test, courts can better alleviate 
the tension between copyright and free expression, while simultaneously 
restoring a more utilitarian vision of copyright consistent with the 
Framers’ intent, through a renewed emphasis on transformative use. 
IV. AN INTERMEDIATE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INFRINGEMENT/FAIR-USE 
DICHOTOMY 
As illustrated, the vast expansion of the copyright monopoly over the 
past two centuries has resulted in a growing tension between the property 
rights granted to authors in their creative works and the expressive rights 
guaranteed to the public under the First Amendment. A cursory 
examination of the judicial response to this tension reveals denial, with 
courts blithely dismissing any conflict between copyright and expressive 
rights. However, in certain copyright-related contexts, the courts have 
explicitly acknowledged and addressed First Amendment concerns 
presented by expanding intellectual property protections.137 In each of 
these instances, however, the courts have possessed a strong degree of 
structural discretion and flexibility. In delineating the idea/expression 
dichotomy, the courts have had great discretion as a result of the relative 
lack of statutory guidance. In meting out relief, courts have enjoyed wide 
latitude and have therefore considered First Amendment factors when 
contemplating injunctions in infringement cases. In confronting 
misappropriation suits, the courts have had sole power to define the 
(common-law) action and to determine whether the cause of action is 
preempted under the Copyright Act. In circumscribing the right of 
publicity, the novelty of the doctrine, its common law origins, and the 
lack of precedent shaping its limits have enabled such courts as the 
California Supreme Court to engage in sui generis balancing tests to 
incorporate expressive interests. 
By contrast, on the issue of fair use, the four-part balancing test and 
the century-and-a-half of precedent interpreting it have combined to limit 
courts to a draconian dichotomy. Either a court can find fair use—in 
which case a defendant can make a specific use of a copyrighted work 
with no permission or payment to the copyright holder—or the court 
finds infringement—in which case a defendant faces the possibility of 
astronomical statutory damages. This harsh binary is particularly 
 
 137. See supra Part III.B. 
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troublesome given the broad statutory definition of a derivative work and 
the fact that transformative uses—uses that advance dissemination of 
creative works with new meanings, expression, and messages—typically 
fail to qualify for fair-use protection under the current balancing test. 
Since transformative uses implicate the expressive rights of their creators 
and advance the utilitarian goals of the federal copyright regime, this 
Article seeks to unburden them through the proposal of an intermediate 
liability alternative. 
A. Reconciling Copyright and Expressive Rights:  
Assessing the Extant Proposals 
In recent years, scholars have proposed a plethora of reforms to 
address the expanding scope of the copyright monopoly, the challenges 
raised by emerging technologies, and the classic tension between 
incentivizing creation and dissemination of creative works while 
simultaneously encouraging widespread access to these works and their 
reuse and adaptation. For example, William Landes and Richard Posner 
have suggested the creation of indefinitely renewable copyrights;138 both 
Neil Netanel and William Fisher have advocated the taxation of 
technologies used for copyright infringement to compensate copyright 
holders;139 and Joseph Liu has argued that the scope of fair use should 
increase on a sliding scale as copyrighted works grow older.140 A 
number of proposals have also touched upon the reconciliation of First 
Amendment concerns with the modern copyright regime. Before 
advancing a specific doctrinal reform to address the expressive-rights 
constraints identified in this Article, it bears considering the relative 
merits and weaknesses of these proposals. At least three broad categories 
of proposals exist: refinement of the fair-use test, the movement of 
copyright from a property to a liability regime, and the judicial 
imposition of joint authorship. As I argue, despite their virtues, the extant 
proposals either fail to or do not fully address the precise expressive 
rights concerns raised by transformative uses. 
 
 138. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 471 (2003). 
 139. WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 199 (2004). Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow 
Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003). 
 140. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410 (2002). 
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1. Refining the fair-use test 
a. Focusing on market failure. To begin with, a number of scholars 
have advocated refinement of the fair-use test.141 Besides Judge Leval’s 
proposal,142 the most widely discussed vision—intended as both a 
descriptive means to reconcile prior fair-use jurisprudence and a 
predictive and prescriptive model for future fair-use cases—comes from 
Wendy Gordon, who has advanced a reformulation of the fair-use test to 
address specific instances of market failure—where the transaction costs 
for obtaining the permission to use a work exceed the value of a work to 
a user.143 Motivated by this dilemma, Gordon suggests a fair-use test that 
balances three factors: (a) the existence of market failure for the use of a 
copyrighted work, (b) the public interest served by the use, and (c) the 
effect of uncompensated use on the original copyright owner’s incentive 
to create.144 
While highlighting the important transaction cost concerns that 
dominate the fair-use landscape, Gordon’s proposal does not successfully 
advance the transformative-use and expressive-rights concerns 
highlighted in this Article.145 As Gordon herself writes, “[T]he 
‘productive’ status of a user is at best merely a secondary indicator that 
[the concerns in her vision of fair use] may be satisfied. . . . [I]t is the 
user faced with market failure, whether he is a second author or an 
‘ordinary’ user, who is the traditional judicial and statutory object of fair 
use solicitude.”146 For example, Gordon’s proposal does nothing to 
encourage the dissemination of noncommercial transformative uses of 
copyrighted works, particularly where the owner of the copyright refuses 
to allow any use of the work or demands a price that the noncommercial 
user simply cannot pay.147 These situations deserve the most exacting 
 
 141. See, e,g., Fischer, supra note 38; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600 (1982); Leval, supra note 44; Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, 
Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation 130, 140 (Nov. 9, 2001) (presented at the Duke 
Conference on the Public Domain), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf. 
 142. See supra Part III. 
 143. Gordon, supra note 141, at 1618.  
 144. Id. at 1601, 1614. 
 145. For an excellent discussion on the broader questions raised by Gordon’s analysis, see 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1300–02 (1999). 
 146. Gordon, supra note 141, at 1601, 1654. 
 147. For instance, there is no strict market failure in the ability to obtain permission to use a 
popular song for the purposes of a transformative political satire of the 2004 elections akin to that of 
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First Amendment scrutiny as they involve speech most likely to contain 
original expressive content absent a profit motive. Moreover, as David 
Lange and Laura Lange Anderson have eloquently argued, the primacy 
of the marketplace in Gordon’s heuristic is not entirely appropriate for 
the equitable fair-use doctrine: 
Sometimes, though an antecedent work is available, and at a price and 
on terms that one reasonable person or another might find 
unobjectionable, still the price and terms may be the subject of 
resistance on principled grounds, so that in effect the continued 
interposition of the copyright regime amounts to a state-sanctioned 
approval of one political agenda as against another, an approval 
wrought through the suppression of dissident speech and writings. And 
sometimes, far more simply, a pearl is beyond price. Sometimes it is 
inappropriate, even garish, to think in terms of a market. Sometimes, in 
short, the market does not fail. Sometimes the market is irrelevant.148 
 
b. A presumption in favor of transformative use. To this effect, 
Lange and Anderson have also proposed their own twist to the fair-use 
test, arguing that all transformative uses, not merely parodies, should 
receive a presumption of fair use.149 However, several problems plague 
this plan. First of all, the Lange/Anderson proposal does little to reduce 
the fair-use balancing test’s uncertainty—and the concomitant and 
profound chilling effects that result from it. Even with a presumption of 
fair use for transformative works, significant doubt remains, ex ante, as 
to whether a use is transformative in the first place. The Lange/Anderson 
proposal therefore comes no closer than the existing fair-use test to 
alleviating this uncertainty. Like the Leval proposal, the Lange/Anderson 
model also fails to acknowledge the federal courts’ repeated limitation of 
transformative use to parody, not satire, and their reduction of the 
transformative-use test to a calculus on necessity;150 the Lange/Anderson 
proposal proves problematic because it proffers a more expansive notion 
of transformative use than the courts have been willing to adopt without 
 
JibJab, see infra note 223: one need simply obtain permission from the copyright holder of the 
musical composition. As a result, in such a circumstance, Gordon’s proposal would not support fair 
use. However, if the copyright holder demands too high a price for a license or refuses to license the 
musical composition altogether, society will be denied the benefit of the creation and dissemination 
of a transformative use of the original copyrighted work. 
 148. Lange & Anderson, supra note 141, at 147. 
 149. Id. at 130. 
 150. See infra Part III.B.  
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bridging this gap. As a consequence, there is no reason to believe that the 
judiciary will abandon its circumscribed notion of transformative use. 
Finally, as Lange and Anderson themselves note, fair use is an 
equitable doctrine at its core. Yet the existing system of fair use and the 
proposals by both Gordon and Lange/Anderson embrace a winner-take-
all system that leaves the author of the original work aggrieved with no 
legal recourse whatsoever for a taking deemed “fair.”151 To address this 
problem, Lange and Anderson offer a corollary to their fair-use proposal: 
for works that have not earned an original author sufficient money to 
recoup a return, any transformative uses should be considered joint 
works with apportionment of profits.152 Though intriguing, such a 
proposal is ultimately ill advised. Determining when and if an original 
work has earned its author a “fair return” is fraught with difficulty—the 
idea of a just return is both impossible to define and hard to measure. 
2. Damages, not injunctions: moving copyright to a liability, rather than 
property, regime 
While some groups focus on redefining fair use, several other 
proposals have sought to maximize the dissemination of creative works 
by reconceptualizing copyright as a liability, rather than property, 
regime. Such proposals have taken two principal forms: the judicial 
option and the legislative option. 
 
a. The judicial option: strict scrutiny of injunctive relief. First, 
reformers have suggested that courts limit the availability of injunctive 
relief in cases of infringement, thereby restricting recovery to damages 
alone. Footnote ten of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose appears to endorse such a tack: 
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment 
as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases involving parodies 
(or other critical works), courts may also wish to bear in mind that the 
goals of the copyright law, “to stimulate the creation and publication of 
edifying matter,” . . . are not always best served by automatically 
granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone 
beyond the bounds of fair use.153 
 
 151. Lange & Anderson, supra note 141, at 152.  
 152. Id. at 154. 
 153. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval, 
supra note 44, at 1134). 
2TEHRANIAN.FIN.DOC 2/21/2006 4:54:01 PM 
1201] Whither Copyright? 
 1235 
In the decade since the Campbell decision, however, courts have 
demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to embrace a pure liability regime 
for copyright law.154 The dramatic shift in copyright from a state-granted 
utilitarian privilege to a natural-law property right155 has undoubtedly 
foreclosed the wholesale adoption of a liability regime. Thus, injunctive 
relief and the award of monetary damages have generally continued to go 
hand-in-hand. 
Even if more widely embraced, the footnote-ten solution does not 
fully address the First Amendment concerns raised in three ways. First, 
as described earlier,156 the continued availability of statutory damages, 
which often exceed actual damages by a wide margin, casts widespread 
chilling effects on potential speech. Second, a footnote-ten solution does 
not unfetter noncommercial transformative uses. Although the footnote-
ten solution enables noncommercial transformative users to speak freely 
(i.e., without government restraint), it does not enable them to speak 
freely (i.e., without payment of significant damages). Where such 
noncommercial transformative uses constitute core speech deserving of 
First Amendment protection, such uses properly deserve freedom in both 
senses of the word. 
Finally, a footnote-ten solution still fails to address one of the most 
serious risks of the fair-use regime: uncertainty. Ex ante, even if a use is 
unlikely to infringe (or fall subject to only monetary damages), a 
transformative user still cannot be sure whether an injunction would 
issue under the blurry standards articulated under Campbell and its 
progeny. Thus, the judicial option, fraught with uncertainty and unknown 
economic costs, can only partially solve the problem. 
 
b. The legislative option: expanding the scope of compulsory licenses 
by statute. Instead of leaving the decision to a reluctant judiciary, some 
observers have advocated statutory adoption of a pure liability regime, 
through a system of compulsory license, for certain types of otherwise 
infringing activity.157 Indeed, compulsory licenses are valuable devices 
 
 154. A decoupling of injunctive and monetary relief has simply not occurred, despite this 
admonition by the Campbell Court and the decision not to issue injunctive relief, despite 
infringement, in Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), see supra Part III.A.2. 
 155. See Tehranian, supra note 21.  
 156. See supra Part III.B.  
 157. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 193–98 (2004) (endorsing, at least 
for a time, a compulsory licensing scheme to support digital music distribution); LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
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for granting the public access to copyrighted works while simultaneously 
providing authors with compensation (albeit fixed) for the use of their 
works. The modern copyright regime uses such licenses in carefully 
circumscribed instances, most notably by enabling anyone to cover a 
published musical composition,158 by allowing cable operators to 
retransmit television and radio signals159 and satellite providers to 
retransmit superstation and network broadcasts,160 and by permitting 
certain digital audio transmissions161 and noncommercial 
broadcasting.162 
However, besides the bureaucratic complexities that inevitably arise 
in the rate-determination process, compulsory licenses possess only a 
limited ability to reconcile the expressive interests raised by the 
expansive modern copyright regime. As Diane Zimmerman has argued, 
compulsory fees “contribute to inevitable wealth-based informational 
disparities among members of society. Access conditioned on ability to 
pay can lead to distortions that offend our norms of individual equality, 
and that impede the possibility of fully realizing individual potential.”163 
Simply put, to have free speech, some speech (considered part of the 
public domain) must be free in an economic sense. 
 
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, ch. 7 (2001) (praising the utility of compulsory schemes in a variety of 
contexts, including cable retransmissions of broadcast signals and the mechanical “cover song” right 
for music); Fred Von Lohmann, New Music Rules Are Needed, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, April 14, 
2003, available at http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2003/04/14/opinion/7930.shtml 
(advocating a compulsory license scheme to resolve the threat faced by the music industry from 
peer-2-peer file sharing). Judge Alex Kozinski and Christopher Newman have also come close to 
advancing a compulsory licensing system in certain contexts. They have proposed a thoughtful 
profit-allocation regime to address concerns about transformative use and expressive rights. See 
Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use? 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
513 (1999). For transformative uses, their statutory reform eliminates the fair-use defense and 
statutory damages, seeks to curb the availability of injunctive relief, restricts profit disgorgement to 
those returns directly attributable to the infringement, and altogether eliminates recovery of actual 
damages stemming from critical evaluation of a copyrighted work. Id. at 525–26. Additionally, the 
scheme uses attorneys’ fees provisions to encourage parties to reach license arrangements prior to 
litigation. Id. at 526. Despite its strong merits, the proposal relies on greater willingness to scrutinize 
strictly claims for injunctive relief. As I have discussed earlier, however, a decade of jurisprudence 
has revealed judicial reluctance to accept the footnote-ten solution advanced by Campbell. See supra 
Part IV.A.2.a. 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
 159. Id. § 111(d). 
 160. Id. § 119. 
 161. Id. § 114(d). 
 162. Id. § 118. 
 163. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right To Have Something To Say? One View of 
the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 368 (2004). 
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Edwin Baker has observed, “[S]peech freedom is a liberty—not a 
market—right. Freedom of speech gives a person a right to say what she 
wants. It does not give the person a right to charge a price for the 
opportunity to hear or receive her speech.”164 Specifically, the law 
should permit, without charge, the creation of certain transformative uses 
(and fair uses) of copyrighted works. A regime in which limited 
duplication of copyrighted works for academic use is subject to a 
compulsory license rather than a fair-use defense would only exacerbate 
plutocratic tendencies in our educational system. A regime where parody 
is subjected to a compulsory license rather than a transformative-use 
defense would exclude individuals or publishers falling below a certain 
economic threshold from the right to engage in mocking exegesis of our 
cultural canon. Such results not only undermine individual expressive 
rights (and divide them on economic grounds), but also prevent society 
from achieving the central goal of the copyright system: maximizing the 
creation and dissemination of original works. 
3. Judicial creation of joint authorship 
In a sidebar to their proposal advocating the presumptive fairness of 
unlicensed transformative uses, Lange and Anderson suggest that 
transformative uses of works that have not yet earned a fair return for 
their original creator should be designated as joint works of authorship 
between the original creator and the transformative user.165 Given the 
problems of defining and measuring the concept of fair return, such a 
proposal is somewhat quixotic. However, Lange and Anderson do not 
consider a related and more practical position: applying the heuristic of 
joint authorship as the default rule for all transformative uses. This joint-
authorship solution ameliorates two of the key tensions between 
copyright law and expressive rights: it unfetters noncommercial uses—if 
a use does not generate profit, it creates no liability. It also subverts the 
harsh binary of the extant copyright regime in which either (1) an 
original creator is able to interdict all uses of her work, or (2) an 
unauthorized user is free to exploit a copyrighted work without any 
remuneration to its original creator. 
Although joint ownership relieves some of the tensions between 
copyright law and expressive rights, it also suffers from the same key 
problem afflicting the proposals discussed supra: continued ex ante 
 
 164. Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, supra note 6, at 903. 
 165. Lange & Anderson, supra note 141, at 154–55. 
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uncertainty over what counts as a transformative use (and the chilling 
effects that therefore result). Moreover, the federal courts have exhibited 
a profound reluctance to divide property rights, particularly in the 
copyright context. For example, courts have repeatedly invoked strained 
interpretations of section 101’s definition of joint works to avoid the 
partitioning of ownership.166 As J. David Yarbrough has pointed out, 
nearly every modern court faced with a joint work issue has “duly noted 
the consequences of co-ownership of a copyright, perhaps in an attempt 
to justify the miscarriage of justice that was imminent in most of those 
cases.”167 As another observer has understatedly rued, “the joint work 
doctrine has been treated grudgingly.”168 
Similarly, when given specific discretion by statute to divide rights 
in a work on equitable grounds, the courts have often demurred. Under 
the original 1976 Copyright Act, for example, an individual who 
innocently infringed a work that omitted notice of its copyrighted status 
received exemption from actual and statutory damages.169 Additionally, 
a court possessed explicit discretion under the statute to award the 
infringer profits, issue injunctive relief, and impose a compulsory license 
to allow continuing infringement.170 Despite this grant of power to create 
joint ownership, courts largely ignored this section of the Act and 
declined Congress’s invitation to impose a compulsory licensing 
scheme.171 All told, the reluctance of courts to issue joint-authorship 
relief to litigants has created a significant practical obstacle to a plan 
relying on judicial discretion for such an intermediate liability solution. 
 
 166. J. David Yarbrough, Jr., What’s Mine Might Be Yours: Why We Should Rethink the 
Default Rule for Copyright Co-ownership in Joint Works, 76 TUL. L. REV. 493, 508–09 (2001) 
(arguing that the decision in Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991), created an intent 
requirement far beyond that mandated in section 101(a) (intent to merge contributions) by requiring 
intent to form a joint work and by requiring an independently copyrightable contribution from each 
putative co-author, despite an absence of such a requirement by statute). 
 167. Id. at 509 n.114 (citing Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998); Childress 
v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1991); Clogston v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 903 
F. Supp. 1156, 1162 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Respect, Inc. v. Comm. on the Status of Women, 815 F. 
Supp. 1112, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1993)). 
 168. Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint Work 
Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REV. 43, 54 (1997). 
 169. 90 Stat. 2541, 2578, §§ 405(b), 406(a) (1976).  
 170. Id. 
 171. See R. Anthony Reese, The History of Innocent Infringement Liability in Copyright Law 
45–48 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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B. The Proposal 
1. The basics 
As this analytical survey indicates, a variety of shortcomings plague 
extant proposals for copyright reform, especially as they relate to 
unfettering transformative uses and advancing expressive rights. After 
all, as I have argued, transformative uses of copyrighted works lie at the 
heart of the growing tension between the First Amendment and 
intellectual property protections.172 Drawing upon the strengths of the 
joint authorship proposal discussed supra, this Article advances an 
intermediate liability alternative that would undermine the harsh binary 
of the existing infringement/fair-use regime while averting the problems 
that doom the joint-authorship proposal—ex ante chilling effects and the 
judicial reluctance to impose divided ownership schemes. In short, the 
intermediate liability alternative would encourage the creation and 
dissemination of transformative uses to the simultaneous benefit of the 
utilitarian goals of the copyright regime and the free speech rights of the 
public. 
Under the intermediate liability alternative, a court would first 
determine whether a work is infringing. If the work infringes, a 
defendant could proffer two defenses—fair use and transformative use. 
The fair-use defense would continue to function as it currently does, 
providing immunity from liability for individuals meeting the four-part 
balancing test delineated in section 107 of the Copyright Act. Thus, such 
practices as time-shifting would remain protected and insulated from 
liability,173 as would other nontransformative activities (including some 
forms of Xeroxing for noncommercial academic purposes) that have 
been deemed fair use. Pursuant to the fair-use doctrine, such uses would 
be absolved of payment or apportionment. 
However, if a defense of fair use fails, a defendant can elect the 
intermediate liability option by arguing that she has engaged in 
transformative use of the copyrighted work. To do so, she must have 
properly registered her work as a transformative use with the Copyright 
Office. Drawing upon the Supreme Court’s reigning definition, a use is 
transformative if it “adds something new, with a further purpose or 
 
 172. See supra Part II. 
 173. See Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417 (1985) (deeming time-shifting—the use of a VCR 
for the purposes of recording a television program for later viewing—fair use). 
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different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”174 To assist in this determination, the Copyright 
Office would issue guidelines that define certain categories of use as 
transformative, thereby providing ex ante guidance on what constitutes 
transformative use.175 
Under this new intermediate liability option, transformative uses 
would include, inter alia, parody, satire, digital sampling, and 
appropriationist modern art, as each of these activities draws upon 
copyrighted works to create a new work of art imbued with new 
expressions that criticize or illuminate our values, assess our social 
institutions, satire current events, or comment on our most notorious 
cultural symbols.176 For uses that emerge with the development of new 
technologies, the Copyright Office would engage in a public comment 
and consideration system akin to the liability exemption system provided 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.177 The Copyright Office 
would also retain discretion to add to the categories of uses determined 
“transformative.” 
For all such transformative uses registered with the Copyright 
Office, intermediate liability would attach. The resulting transformative 
use would be exempt from actual and statutory damages as well as 
injunctive relief.178 Thus, the law would permit the creation and 
dissemination of transformative use without the consent of the author of 
the original work from which the transformative use drew. By default, 
however, the original author of the copyrighted work and the 
transformative user of that work would evenly divide all profits resulting 
from the commercial exploitation of the transformative work.179 
 
 174. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Leval, supra 
note 44, at 1111 (defining transformative use as a use that “adds value to the original—if the quoted 
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new 
insights and understandings”). 
 175. I am indebted to a conversation with Pamela Samuelson for this aspect of the proposal. 
 176. See Tehranian, supra note 21. 
 177. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(E) (2000); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention 
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,578-01 (Oct. 15, 
2002); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,574 (Oct. 27, 2000). 
 178. Of course, subject to deference to the Copyright Office, federal courts would have the 
right to review a determination of transformative use. 
 179. As I argue later, it is anticipated that most copyright users and copyright owners will 
enter into arrangements much more nuanced than this default option. See infra notes 180–83 and 
accompanying text. On a related note, therefore, most enforcement will fall in private hands with the 
option of litigation should the parties breach their contractual profit-sharing arrangements. 
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Upon cursory examination, the decision to create a default position 
of even profit apportionment appears somewhat arbitrary. After all, 
under the Coase theorem, the same outcome will result regardless of 
initial legal entitlement assuming zero transaction costs.180 However, 
two grounds subvert the traditional Coasian admonishment regarding the 
irrelevance of initial entitlement distributions and support such a default 
position. First of all, the Coasian world is, of course, characterized by a 
lack of transaction costs.181 By contrast, the world of copyright 
permissions is replete with transaction costs, especially given the absence 
of a centralized clearinghouse for effectuating licensing and the nebulous 
and poorly documented chains of copyright title. Given the free speech 
issues inherent in transformative use of copyrighted works, a default 
position allowing, rather than proscribing, transformative uses is 
warranted. 
Secondly, although the Coasian world does not necessarily envision 
the refusal of certain parties to deal as a market failure,182 the presence 
of such parties undermines progress in the arts. In the world of copyright 
licensing, there are many parties that simply decline to permit any 
transformative uses of their works, even if they might derive substantial 
economic advantages from such licensing. Since such holdouts impede 
the availability of transformative uses to society—uses that the Supreme 
Court has deemed accretive to the central goal of copyright to advance 
progress in the arts183—a default position that facilitates transformative 
use is preferable to the current system, which discourages it. 
What is critical here is not the value judgment that may be signified 
through a choice to divide profits evenly between the original copyright 
owner and the transformative user. Indeed, if debate over the issue 
warrants a different balance—say 90% to 10% in favor of the original 
copyright owner, or 10% to 90% in favor of the transformative user—so 
be it. What is key is the creation of a liability option that subverts the 
draconian choice presently faced by the courts. Currently, if a court finds 
infringement, then ownership of the transformative use is divided 100% 
to 0% in favor of the original copyright owner. By contrast, if a court 
finds fair use, then ownership of the transformative use is divided 0% to 
100% in favor of the transformative user. The default position of even 
 
 180. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. “[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the 
creation of transformative works.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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profit division can easily be contracted around, but it creates a reasonable 
starting point for negotiations between the original copyright owner and 
the transformative user. Specifically, by creating a default position of 
profit sharing, the intermediate liability regime prevents original 
copyright owners from discriminating between favorable and 
unfavorable transformative uses of their copyrighted works. 
Most importantly, noncommercial users would be free to appropriate 
copyrighted works for transformative purposes without compensation. 
Thus, the proposed regime unburdens precisely the type of speech that 
has historically received the greatest protection under First Amendment 
jurisprudence—noncommercial expression. Meanwhile, commercial 
users would be able to appropriate copyrighted works for transformative 
purposes for a price that grows only in proportion to the profit earned 
from exploitation of the work. Thus, liability would never exceed 
profitability, thereby advancing constitutionally protected expressive 
freedoms. Taken together, such a scheme would alleviate free speech 
concerns, encourage transformative uses that promote progress in the 
arts, and maintain the economic incentives for authors to create and 
disseminate their works. 
2.  Clarifications and limitations 
A similar theory has been proposed in the model for the Xanadu 
project; this proposal was envisioned as a digital library and hypertext 
publishing system where users could link to the works of others and 
create their own derivative works based thereon.184 Theorist Theodor 
Nelson created this model so that copyright owners would waive their 
derivative rights when placing their work on the system but would 
receive royalties for derivative creations; royalties would be shared 
between the author of the original work and the individual making use of 
the original work to create a derivative product.185 
The intermediate liability proposal is also similar to the joint 
authorship proposal assessed above,186 but it possesses several key 
advantages over the joint authorship proposal. First, it diminishes the 
uncertainty problem afflicting wholesale judicial determination of 
 
 184. See THEODOR H. NELSON, LITERARY MACHINES (87.1 ed. 1987); see also Pamela 
Samuelson & Robert Glushko, Intellectual Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext 
Publishing Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 247–55 (1993). 
 185. Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 184, at 249. 
 186. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
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transformative use by setting out, ex ante, the types of uses deemed 
transformative for the purposes of intermediate liability.187 Certainly, 
courts can review these determinations, but the findings of the Copyright 
Office would be entitled to heavy deference. Second, this proposal routes 
around the profound judicial reluctance to divide ownership of 
copyright188 by putting the issue in the hands of the Copyright Office. 
Finally, the proposal avoids one of the implications of joint authorship—
that the original creator both authorized and collaborated in the creation 
of the transformative work. Under the intermediate liability proposal 
advanced by this Article, a transformative work cannot be attributed to 
the original author unless the original author requests it. Trademark law 
will take an increasingly important role under such a regime to ensure an 
absence of confusion regarding the origin of copyrighted works. 
For example, if I write a satire of the 2008 elections based on Star 
Wars, I can make use of the storyline, characters (e.g., Yoda, Darth 
Vader, Luke Skywalker) and terms (e.g., Jedi, lightsaber, Star Wars) 
from the movie series, but I cannot attribute my satire to George Lucas. 
If anything, a disclaimer on my work should make it clear that it is an 
unauthorized derivative work. However, George Lucas, as the original 
copyright holder to Star Wars, would be entitled to a presumptive 50% 
of any profits that result from the creation of my work. 
It is also important to note the limits of this proposal. As Rebecca 
Tushnet and Lloyd Weinreb have both pointed out, a use need not be 
transformative to possess a valuable purpose.189 Sometimes, as in the 
case of classroom duplication, providing copies of copyrighted works 
serves a significant social end.190 Moreover, a number of existing 
limitations on the copyright monopoly serve important free speech 
interests without advancing transformative-use rights. These constraints 
include the idea/expression dichotomy, the denial of copyright to 
government works, the first-sale doctrine, compulsory licenses, liability 
exemptions for schools and libraries, the merger doctrine, and the lack of 
a broad performance right for sound recordings.191 Interests in pure 
 
 187. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 189. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How the Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 568–72 (2004); Weinreb, supra note 141, at 1143. 
 190. Tushnet, supra note 189, at 568–72 (arguing that pure copying can advance First 
Amendment interests in self-expression, persuasion and affirmation). Many of her examples, 
however, are arguably transformative and not pure copying, such as cover versions of songs or plays 
and original juxtapositions of copyrighted works. See id. 
 191. Id. at 553. 
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copying will continue to be served by application of the fair-use test and 
the existing limits on the copyright monopoly. Meanwhile, this Article 
seeks to address the transformative-use problem in copyright law. 
C. Concerns 
The intermediate liability scheme proposed here is not without 
several immediate concerns on implementation, workability, and 
incentivization grounds. Each of these three areas is addressed in turn. 
1. Implementation 
a. Enactment of the intermediate liability scheme. Deviating from 
law review tradition, I first consider the actual practicality of 
implementing the intermediate liability scheme advanced here. Statutory 
change will undoubtedly be difficult. Robert Merges has characterized 
the history of intellectual property rights over the past one-hundred years 
as a century of “solicitude” by corporate interests bent on maximizing 
monopoly-like protections for their intellectual properties.192 Simply put, 
the derivative rights doctrine provides the content creation industries 
with an economic boon that—Panglossian optimism aside—they are 
unlikely to give up without a massive fight. Nevertheless, this fact does 
not obviate the need to consider doctrinal alternatives to the modern 
copyright regime, especially in light of its increasing clash with 
expressive interests. 
Moreover, in recent years, the public has demonstrated increasing 
awareness over the impact of the modern copyright regime on expressive 
freedoms and quotidian activities. Additionally, just as the boom in peer-
to-peer file sharing has benefited many companies—including cable and 
DSL operators, computer and hard drive manufacturers, and consumer 
electronics providers193—there are also powerful corporate interests that 
could benefit from the type of revisions advanced here. Companies that 
sell the technological tools for making transformative uses would stand 
to profit from a regime that expanded transformative rights. Greater “fair 
use” rights could also inure to the long-run economic benefit of the 
content creation industry. Despite losing the Sony v. Universal decision, 
the entertainment industry did not suffer a precipitous demise. In fact, the 
 
 192. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2191 (2000). 
 193. See John Tehranian, The High Court in Cyberspace: A Preview of MGM Studios v. 
Grokster, UTAH B.J., Mar/Apr. 2005, at 28. 
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legality of the VCR and the DVD and the deeming of time-shifting as 
fair use have vastly expanded revenue-generation opportunities for the 
Hollywood studios; they now earn more profit from DVD/video rental 
and sales than from theatrical ticket sales.194 Thus, a coalition of 
consumer rights groups, technology manufacturers, and innovative 
content providers could provide support for the adoption of the 
intermediate liability proposal. 
 
b. Rethinking the derivative rights doctrine. Adoption of an 
intermediate liability scheme would inextricably necessitate a 
reexamination of the derivative rights doctrine. As the Supreme Court 
argued in Campbell, the creation and dissemination of transformative 
works advances the constitutional goal of progress in the arts.195 
However, the broad exclusive right of copyright owners to prepare 
derivative works has swallowed up the ability of transformative users to 
escape infringement liability, thereby undermining the key goal of the 
federal copyright regime. Commenting on an Illinois court’s blunt 
rejection of a transformative-use claim by the creator of a guidebook on 
Beanie Babies on the grounds that such an activity violated the derivative 
works rights of the Beanie Baby creators,196 Matthew Bunker noted, 
“[C]reating a derivative work is at least suggestive of some 
transformation. When coupled with the addition of new information and 
interpretation regarding the toys, the claim at least deserves serious 
judicial analysis.”197 
However, the strictures of section 106 of the Copyright Act do not 
allow for such analysis as they unequivocally provide copyright owners 
with the exclusive right to “prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”198 While original copyright laws protected solely 
against slavish reproduction of an entire work, modern copyright law 
expansively protects the actual copyrighted work itself (whether 
borrowed in part or whole), nonliteral elements of the copyrighted work, 
and any derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.199 Thus, 
translations and abridgements, formerly considered transformative uses 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 196. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 197. Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine After 
Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2002). 
 198. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 199. See supra Part II.A. 
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of a copyrighted work and therefore per se noninfringing,200 are now 
categorized as derivative works that come under the exclusive right of a 
copyright owner under section 106.201 Indeed, section 101 of the 
Copyright Act defines a ‘derivative work’ as “a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”202 This definition, which 
implicates transformative uses as derivative ones, undermines the very 
viability of a transformative-use defense in copyright law. 
As copyright historically evolved from the narrow right to interdict 
duplication of one’s original work to a broader right to interdict, 
irrespective of form, any borrowing of the elusive intellectual essence of 
one’s original work, an artificial hierarchy of works emerged to 
rationalize the expansion of an author’s property right.203 Appealing to 
the romantic notion of authorship as a flash of genius, this hierarchy 
presented “some works . . . as inherently superior due to their supposed 
originality, [and] relegated [other works] to the now, by definition, 
inferior status of derivatives.”204 This unchallenged hierarchy—which 
began to take shape in the nineteenth century—begs reconsideration on 
two important grounds: the important role of transformative use in the 
advancement of the arts and the value of transformative use on 
expressive grounds. 
To revitalize the role of transformative use in copyright 
jurisprudence, the derivative works doctrine must therefore be 
reexamined. Naomi Voegtli, for one, has suggested fine-tuning the 
 
 200. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 201. In 1870, Congress overturned the Stowe decision by statute, explicitly adding the right to 
translate one’s work to the list of exclusive rights guaranteed to a copyright owner. See Copyright 
Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870) (current version at 17 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2000)). In 
the meantime, the protection afforded to abridgement and commentary has shrunk markedly over the 
past century, particularly in recent years. See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 
F.2d 1366, 1370 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that defendants’ book about television program Twin Peaks 
infringed copyrights in teleplays for series); cf. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 955 
F. Supp. 260, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Seinfeld Aptitude Test, trivia book on all things 
Seinfeld, constituted unauthorized derivative work that infringed Castle Rock’s copyright in Seinfeld 
television program). 
 202. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 203. Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
 204. Id. As discussed earlier, such “inferior” works included translations and abridgements. 
See supra Part II.A. 
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definition of derivative works so that they constitute “either (1) a work 
based significantly upon one or more pre-existing works, such that it 
exhibits little originality of its own or that it unduly diminishes economic 
prospects of the works used; or (2) a translation, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, and condensation.”205 Contrary to the existing 
definition of derivative work, a revised definition must draw a distinction 
between uses that are transformative and uses that are merely derivative. 
The first part of the Voegtli definition accomplishes this goal by simply 
defining a derivative work as a nontransformative use of someone else’s 
copyrighted work. The adoption of such a definition of derivative work 
would go a long way towards reconciling the inherent conflict between 
the present definition of derivative works and the viability of 
transformative-use defenses to infringement. The second part of 
Voegtli’s definition represents a catch-all for potentially transformative 
uses that, for public policy reasons, may be deemed to nevertheless 
infringe under the derivative rights doctrine. Potentially transformative 
uses that the courts feel would not sufficiently advance progress in the 
arts could be placed under the second part of the derivative works 
definition. 
Quite simply, we should ask ourselves whether translations, sound 
recordings, art reproductions, abridgements, condensations, and other 
heretofore unknown manipulations of copyrighted works in the digital 
age are sufficiently accretive to progress in the arts that we want to 
encourage their dissemination without fear of infringement liability. If 
the answer is no, then the second part of Voegtli’s definition should be 
integrated into a revision of the derivative rights doctrine. Inevitably, 
adoption of the intermediate liability proposal advanced here will require 
wholesale reconsideration of the derivative right—a doctrine whose 
expansive terms have contributed heavily towards the growing tension 
between copyright and expressive rights. 
2. Workability 
a. Defining transformative use. Once adopted, the intermediate 
liability standard for transformative uses of copyrighted works will not 
be without potential challenges on workability grounds.206 For example, 
 
 205. Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1267 
(1997). 
 206. See, e.g., Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use 
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 724 (1995) (arguing that even the meager renewed emphasis on 
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some observers have speculated that a transformative-use inquiry in 
copyright litigation would necessarily implicate the Copyright Office and 
the courts in the business of judging the quality of artistic works.207 
Certainly, these entities have shied away in the past from emphasizing 
the transformative-use criteria in the fair-use balancing test simply 
because of a fear of marking judgments about the quality of art—an act 
inherently fraught with difficulty. As Justice Holmes explained a century 
ago, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”208 However, 
determining what constitutes transformative use is not commensurate to 
an assessment of whether the use of a copyrighted work in question is in 
good or bad taste, whether the message (or lack thereof) of the allegedly 
infringing work is agreeable, or whether the result of the alleged 
infringement is sublime. As the California Supreme Court stated in its 
adoption of transformative use as a doctrinal limitation on the right of 
publicity: 
In determining whether the work is transformative, courts are not to be 
concerned with the quality of the artistic contribution—vulgar forms of 
expression fully qualify for First Amendment protection. On the other 
hand, a literal depiction of a celebrity, even if accomplished with great 
skill, may still be subject to a right of publicity challenge. The inquiry 
is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the 
literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the 
work.209 
 
productive use hailed by the Campbell Court “stands in the way of sensible application of fair use 
and should be abandoned as a doctrinal dead-end”). See generally Volokh, supra note 6. 
 207. Laura Lape, for example, argues that 
[d]isadvantages of the productive use doctrine include: (1) courts are unclear as to what 
productive use is; (2) productive use doctrine focuses on productivity as an end in itself; 
(3) the productive use factor distracts attention from the central consideration of the first 
factor of section 107, the social utility of the use; (4) to the extent that productive use is 
equated with non-superseding use, productive use doctrine permits the fourth factor of 
section 107 to be counted twice, thus canceling out the impact of the first factor; and (5) 
productive use doctrine encourages courts to evaluate the quality of any work produced 
by the defendant.  
Lape, supra note 206, at 724. 
 208. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 209. Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). The court 
later added, “Although the distinction between protected and unprotected expression will sometimes 
be subtle, it is no more so than other distinctions triers of fact are called on to make in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 811; see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 (1973) 
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Thus, in the copyright context, to ascertain transformative use, the 
Copyright Office and the courts would examine whether something new 
and creative, possessing the ability to contribute to progress in the arts, 
has been developed through the allegedly infringing use.210 Specifically, 
they would draw upon the Supreme Court’s definition of a 
transformative use as one that “adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”211 Thus, slavish imitation of a 
copyrighted work, even if accomplished with great skill, would not 
qualify as transformative. But, even vulgar transmogrifications of a 
copyrighted work, if infused with creative and original elements, would 
qualify as transformative uses. As the Supreme Court has conceded, 
although “transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of 
fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”212 With 
advancement of the arts representing the chief goal of copyright 
protection, one must make some judgment about which policies could 
benefit progress in that arena and which ones would not so benefit. 
Naturally, drawing the line between transformative and non-
transformative uses is laden with subjectivity. However, making such a 
determination in the administrative and judicial contexts is both feasible 
and less troublesome than the muddled fair-use test critiqued in this 
Article and elsewhere. As noted earlier, a transformative-use test is 
consistent with the utilitarian origins of the Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution; such prominent consideration of transformative use would 
bring back the notion of progress in the arts to the forefront of the 
copyright calculus. Further, adoption of a transformative-use test would 
help alleviate the growing clash between copyright law and free speech 
rights.  
This proposal does not dictate a return to the same judgments as our 
predecessors about what constitutes transformative use. Perhaps, we will 
not view the act of translation or abridgement as sufficiently 
transformative or accretive to progress in the arts to warrant intermediate 
 
(requiring determination, in the context of work alleged to be obscene, of “whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
 210. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 211. Id.; see also Leval, supra note 44, at 1111 (defining transformative use as a use that 
“adds value to the original — if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings”). 
 212. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citation omitted). 
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liability under the proposed regime. However, because of the strong 
expressive component latent in transformative works and the high 
potential of transformative works to advance progress in the arts, 
transformative value should lie at the heart of our calculus in carving out 
an exception to traditional copyright liability. Both the dictates of the 
First Amendment and the Copyright Clause warrant explicit assessment 
of the expressive and progressive value of each use—be it a form of 
postmodern art, digital sampling, or some heretofore unknown 
technological manipulation—of copyrighted works. 
 
b. Moral rights and the potential for market glut. Under the 
intermediate liability regime, the public could make transformative uses 
of copyrighted works with impunity. This raises two critical, and related, 
concerns. First, the proposal might precipitate a glut of derivative works 
on the market that would undermine the value, both economically and 
artistically, of the original works. Second, creators would lose control 
over the products of their imagination—including the very characters, 
plotlines, visuals, and semantics that they perceive as extensions of 
themselves.213 As Samuelson and Glushko succinctly state, “Authors 
often regard their writings as expressions of their personalities. Any 
tampering with their texts may be viewed by such authors as a 
‘mutilation’ of the work, as objectionable as if someone had the 
effrontery to walk up to you and cut your hair without your 
permission.”214 
The effective functioning of the section 115 compulsory mechanical 
license215 over the past century not only diffuses both of these concerns 
but also illustrates the tremendous social benefit that can accrue from the 
ability to make unauthorized transformative uses of the copyrighted 
works of others.216 Under the existing copyright regime, the creator of 
 
 213. This is, admittedly, one negative byproduct of the proposal endorsed here. However, such 
a concern is less pressing in an American context than in a European context, where the copyright 
regime gives more recognition to the moral rights of authors. Given the utilitarian slant of American 
copyright law (in both theory and origin), such concerns become deflated when weighed against the 
vital First Amendment interests at stake and the proposal’s ability to advance the creation and 
dissemination of creative works. 
 214. Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 184, at 257. 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
 216. Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, has recently advocated the repeal of the section 
115 compulsory license, but that position appears to be a function of recent technological 
developments in the online digital transmission of music and not a response to the general merits of 
the compulsory license in the pre-digital era or the arguments being made here. See Music Licensing 
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
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the original work holds the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted 
work and to prepare a derivative product based thereon. However, since 
1909, music compositions have enjoyed an exception to this rule. Section 
115 of the Copyright Act provides that anyone can record a cover version 
of a copyrighted, non-dramatic musical composition and distribute 
copies of it.217 No permission is required from the original composer; a 
cover artist need only provide the copyright owner or the Copyright 
Office with notice of her intentions to record a cover song218 and pay a 
per-album fee fixed by a copyright arbitration royalty panel.219 Although 
full transformative use of musical compositions cannot be made under 
the statute, cover artists are free to tinker with the composition in order to 
adapt it to a particular musical genre: “a compulsory license includes the 
privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent 
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the 
performance involved.”220 Thus, without any authorization from the 
original artist, Limp Bizkit can record a thrash-metal version of George 
Michael’s pop song, Faith; Luna a dreamy, lo-fi cover of Guns N’ 
Roses’s Sweet Child O’ Mine; William Shatner a loungy take on Pulp’s 
alternative rock classic Common People; and Dynamite Hack an acoustic 
folk-rock rendition of NWA’s gangsta rap Boyz ‘N tha Hood. 
In fact, as the history of modern music has demonstrated, the public, 
musicians, and the music industry have benefited tremendously from the 
availability of the compulsory mechanical license. Although Bob Dylan 
is a remarkable songwriter and musician, there are few who would 
consider his renditions of All Along the Watchtower and Mr. Tambourine 
Man—two songs that he composed and also recorded—superior to the 
remarkable covers of those songs by Jimi Hendrix and the Byrds, 
respectively. Hendrix’s version of All Along the Watchtower helped 
launch him into rock’s pantheon; it also secured the place of Dylan’s 
composition in rock history. The availability of a section 115 license 
therefore enabled Hendrix to expand his popularity and introduced a 
whole new audience to the works of both Dylan and Hendrix. 
Despite its seemingly perennial platform in support of strong 
copyright protection, the recording industry has ardently supported 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights). 
 217. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a). 
 218. Id. § 115(b). 
 219. Id. § 115(c). 
 220. Id. § 115(a)(2). 
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maintenance of the compulsory mechanical license scheme. The music 
industry’s view of the compulsory mechanical license stands in stark 
contrast to its position on other copyright issues. In hearings before the 
House Committee on the Judiciary in 1967, the recording industry 
argued that “performers need unhampered access to musical material on 
nondiscriminatory terms. . . . [T]he 1909 statute adopted the compulsory 
license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of 
[copyright]. . . . They argue that the result has been an outpouring of 
recorded music, with the public being given lower prices, improved 
quality, and a greater choice.”221 At the very least, we should ask 
ourselves whether the same logic might apply to motion pictures, literary 
works, and other copyrightable subject matter.  
On this point, there is also a favorable body of experience. Although 
the mechanical licensing scheme applies only to musical compositions, 
the public enjoys unadulterated access to any creative works once the 
work’s copyright term expires. In the United States, almost any work 
published prior to 1923 has fallen into the public domain and can 
therefore be used and abused without fear of infringement. Yet, we have 
not witnessed an avalanche of derivative works that undermine the 
artistic integrity and vision espoused by these original works. Moreover, 
the only harm to the commercial market for these original works has 
stemmed, not from the universal ability to make transformative uses of 
these works, but because the works can now be slavishly reproduced 
without running afoul of copyright laws. 
According to ardent protectionists such as Jack Valenti, former 
President of the Motion Picture Association of America, 
A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. 
But everyone exploits it use, until that time certain when it becomes 
soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues. Who, then, will 
invest the funds to renovate and nourish its future life when no one 
owns it?222 
However, the practices of Valenti’s own industry undermine the 
credibility of his claim. Neither the works of Jane Austen nor those of 
 
 221. H.R. DOC. NO. 90-83, at 66 (1967), quoted in LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 58 
(2004). 
 222. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 
989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, 
Motion Picture Association of America) (quoted in Tyler Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the 
Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 256 (2002)). 
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William Shakespeare have become soiled or haggard: the interest in their 
novels and plays continues to thrive and their works continue to enjoy 
such high popular regard that Hollywood studios have based numerous 
movies on them. Ultimately, the works of Jane Austen are not any less 
revered, meaningful, or commercially successful because of Alicia 
Silverstone’s Clueless; Shakespeare is none the worse because of the 
Julia Stiles vehicle, O.223 
Finally, the proposal advanced by this Article would not unilaterally 
wrest power from the hands of artistic innovators. While the intermediate 
liability option will diminish the control that creators have in one sense, 
it will expand control in another sense. Though the ambit of the right to 
exclude would shrink so that creators could no longer prevent 
recoding224 of their copyrighted works, artists would simultaneously 
enjoy an expanded palette of expressive possibilities, including the right 
to engage in transformative uses of all existing copyrighted works. 
 
c. Audience interests in semiotic stability. According to critics of 
reform, an expansive transformative-use regime not only threatens the 
moral rights of artists, it also undermines interests that consumers of 
copyrighted works have in their sustained integrity. In a provocative 
article225 that draws on the work of Landes and Posner,226 Justin Hughes 
has cast light upon a latent cost stemming from the dissemination of 
transformative uses: the harm that copyright audiences suffer when a 
work loses the stability of its meaning. 
To this effect, Hughes first identifies and critiques the literature 
advocating greater freedom for making transformative uses of 
 
 223. Unauthorized transformative uses of copyrighted works can even reignite the meaning 
and value of the original works. Take, for example, JibJab’s brilliant use of Woodie Guthrie’s This 
Land Is Your Land in satirizing George W. Bush and John Kerry during the 2004 elections. See 
http://www.jibjab.com/162.html (last visited November 8, 2005). The satire not only provided both 
amusement and meaning to millions who saw it but also brought renewed attention to Guthrie’s song 
and his oeuvre. Interestingly, the creators of the satire faced the threat of an infringement suit from 
the owners of the publishing rights to Guthrie’s song. Ultimately, the threats were dropped after, 
inter alia, the Electronic Frontier Foundation learned that the publisher’s copyright in the Guthrie 
song had likely lapsed and that This Land had therefore fallen into the public domain. See Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Music Publisher Settles Copyright Skirmish over Guthrie Classic, August 24, 
2004, available at http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2004_08.php. 
 224. For a discussion of recoding, see Justin Hughes, ‘Recoding’ Intellectual Property and 
Overlooking Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Landes & Posner, supra note 138, at 486–88 (noting the value that consumers may derive 
from uniformity in cultural icons). 
2TEHRANIAN.FIN.DOC 2/21/2006 4:54:01 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1254 
copyrighted works. As Hughes points out, this “deconstructionist” line 
has emphasized the rights of secondary users, especially minority groups, 
to access and recode copyrighted work in order to advance interests 
related to free expression and personhood development.227 However, in 
Hughes’s view, such copyright deconstructionists ignore the valuable 
role that limitations on transformative uses play in advancing personhood 
interests: 
[P]utting the focus on the need of some non-owners to recode the 
cultural object de-emphasizes how much all non-owners rely on that 
same cultural object having a stable, commonly understood set of 
meanings. This need for stability exists both for the non-owners who 
want to recode and for a vast, (literally) silent majority who derive 
utility from the object’s stable meanings.228 
Thus, Hughes suggests that the deconstructionist literature has wholly 
ignored the vast positive social externalities that accrue from preserving 
the stability of cultural images. As Hughes rhetorically asks, “What 
justifies concern for the gay artist who wants to print postcards of John 
Wayne wearing pink lipstick but no concern for the young, heterosexual 
army recruit who wants to identify with a stable image of John 
Wayne?”229 
Though thought-provoking, Hughes’s critique suffers from a fatal 
flaw: audience interests in stability of meaning are fundamentally 
different from interests advancing transformative use. In a regime where 
transformative uses are presumptively not allowed, the expressive 
interests of those making the transformative use and the personhood 
interests of those consuming such uses are necessarily suppressed. By 
contrast, when transformative uses are allowed, the stability of cultural 
hieroglyphics is not necessarily undermined. Indeed, as Hughes himself 
concedes,230 many cultural icons that have fallen into the public domain 
(and therefore subject to free recoding)—including Shakespeare, the 
Statute of Liberty, and the Mona Lisa—have retained their core 
meanings. Moreover, as Mark Lemley points out, audience interests in 
stable cultural iconography probably apply only to a small subset of 
 
 227. Hughes, supra note 224, at 928. 
 228. Id. at 941 (emphasis omitted). 
 229. Id. at 958. 
 230. “That people need some stability in the meaning of cultural objects does not mean that 
laws are needed to ensure that stability. Many cultural objects retain stable meanings even when they 
are unprotected. Examples might be the Statue of Liberty, the Mona Lisa, Mount Rushmore, and the 
Eiffel Tower.” Id. at 961. 
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copyrighted works that have achieved widespread dissemination.231 
Thus, when weighing competing utilities between regimes favoring and 
restricting transformative uses, it makes sense to err on the side of an 
expansive right to recode. 
To this effect, market competition can best guide the clash between 
core and fluid meaning and the utilities that they provide. Rather than 
using artificially granted monopolies to create a static intellectual 
property semiotic, copyright policy should allow transformative uses to 
compete against original meanings. In short, if the stability interest in 
John Wayne’s representation of the quintessence of rugged American 
heterosexuality and morality outweighs the aggregate utility that stems 
from the recoding of John Wayne’s image, the marketplace of ideas will 
so dictate. 
3. Preserving economic incentives for artistic creation and dissemination 
Finally, the adoption of an intermediate liability standard for 
transformative uses would not undermine the ability of authors to recoup 
their investment in a work or to earn a reasonable royalty. First, as Pierre 
Leval notes, “the more the appropriator is using the material for new 
transformed purposes, the less likely it is that appropriative use will be a 
substitute for the original.”232 As such, transformative works do not 
interfere with the rightful economic market of the original copyright 
creator. This observation recalls the words of the California Supreme 
Court, which noted in Comedy III that “when a work contains significant 
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First 
Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the 
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”233 
Admittedly, content creators would no longer enjoy the windfall that 
has come from the derivative rights doctrine. However, the intermediate 
liability standard for transformative uses still enables authors to profit 
substantially from the commercial exploitation of their creative works. 
Transformative uses of copyrighted works would no longer constitute 
infringement; but a copyrighted work could not be appropriated without 
compensation, as the creator of the copyrighted work from which an 
 
 231. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 145 (2004). 
 232. Pierre N. Leval, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice 
Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 22–23 (1994). 
 233. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
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appropriator draws would, as a default rule, earn half the profits from the 
commercial exploitation of the transformative end product.234 
The effect on the incentives to create and disseminate knowledge are 
likely minimal. Once again, the experience of the compulsory 
mechanical license is instructive. Section 115 certainly diminishes the 
rights of musical composers vis-à-vis the rights of other content creators. 
Under current law, individuals are not free to film their own remake of 
George Lucas’s Star Wars or write their own sequel to F. Scott 
Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby; yet anyone can record and distribute for 
profit their own interpretation of The Beatles’s Yesterday, regardless of 
how odious the cover might seem to Paul McCartney. Indeed, once a 
musical composer releases a song to the world, she no longer possesses 
the right to control who can take that song and make it her own. 
Nevertheless, modern copyright discourse hears little outcry from 
musical composers about individuals taking their songs, violating the 
moral rights to their artistic creations, profiting unfairly from the 
commercial exploitation of their lyrics and music, and grotesquely 
bowdlerizing the integrity and vision of their works. The suggestion that 
a musician would withhold public release of his musical composition—
because of the knowledge that, under existing law, others can cover the 
song with impunity—simply does not pass the laughter test. In a similar 
vein, given the commercial incentives that will still remain for the 
dissemination of copyrighted works even under the intermediate liability 
scheme, artists of all stripes will continue to release their material to the 
public. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As our examination of modern copyright jurisprudence has revealed, 
the gap between the academy and the courts is not as large as supposed, 
and the courts have expressed growing concerns over the ever-expanding 
gamut of intellectual property protections and their potential clash with 
expressive rights. However, shackled by the fair-use doctrine, courts 
have been unable to address fully the First Amendment issues 
inextricably interwoven in the fabric of copyright law. After all, 
copyrighted works are not just a form of property; they are also the 
primary means through which modern individuals exercise their 
expressive rights. 
 
 234. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, this Article proposes a new intermediate liability 
standard that would apply to transformative uses. Such a standard would 
provide a much needed alternative to the harsh dichotomy of existing 
law, which forces courts to categorize any use of a copyrighted work as 
either an infringement—in which case the use is subjected to weighty 
statutory damages—or a fair use—in which case the use is excused 
without any liability whatsoever. Early copyright jurisprudence gave 
special protection to transformative uses since such uses contributed to 
the underlying goal of the federal copyright system—progress in the 
arts—and supported expressive rights. By targeting transformative uses, 
the intermediate liability regime will encourage progress in the arts, 
rekindle the utilitarian underpinnings of copyright law as envisioned by 
the Framers, advance the protection of vital free speech interests, and 
still retain important economic rewards for the creators of copyrighted 
content. 
 
 
